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Introduction
“Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is
especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”1
“Theories and arguments based upon racial, ethnic and most other
stereotypes are antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impartial
trial.”2
We are in a moment of reckoning about the influence of racial bias
on the criminal justice system.3 To give only a few examples, increased
scrutiny is being placed on racially-motivated police brutality and other

1.

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).

2.

State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 444 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J.,
concurring)).

3.

While this reckoning seems to be gaining traction and speed now, it is not
entirely new; many voices have been calling for this reckoning for a long
time. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89
Geo. L.J. 2227, 2235 (2001) (noting that “[r]acial contamination of the
criminal law in the sway of bias and discrimination is well documented”
and citing sources documenting that history).
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misconduct,4 and on the racial dimensions of mass incarceration.5 The
United States Supreme Court recently described racial bias as “a
familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic
injury to the administration of justice.”6 In the last few years, the Court
has frankly acknowledged ways that individual actors’ racial biases can
affect the criminal justice system, including through jury selection7 and
race-based arguments during jury deliberation.8 And earlier this year,
the Court acknowledged the “clear” racist origins of a structural issue,
the use by two states of nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.9
An overlooked piece of this reckoning, however, is the racist rhetoric10
that prosecutors sometimes use in arguing cases.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the
Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.” 11
4.

See, e.g., Isabel Bilotta, Abby Corrington, Saaid A. Mendoza, Ivy Watson
& Eden King, How Subtle Bias Infects the Law, 15 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc.
Sci. 227, 229 (2019) (discussing bias in policing generally and statistics
showing disproportionate police killings of unarmed Black and Latino
individuals). Beyond police brutality, there is increased scrutiny on the role
of police in the disproportionate outcomes for people of color within the
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Warren, Hidden in Plain
View: Juries and the Implicit Credibility Given to Police Testimony, 11
DePaul J. Soc. Just. 1 (2018) (arguing that jurors often make unfounded
assumptions regarding police credibility).

5.

See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2020) (discussing racial
imbalances and the mass incarcerations of Black men).

6.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).

7.

See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (holding that the trial
court clearly erred in concluding that the state’s peremptory challenge of a
Black juror “was not ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent’”
(quoting Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016))). Although the
court articulated its holding very narrowly, the court explicitly relied on four
“critical facts” that each showed racial bias in the prosecutor’s actions. See
id.

8.

See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (holding that an exception to the
non-impeachment rule about jury verdicts is needed to allow trial courts
to consider juror reports about racially biased comments or actions).

9.

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (noting the “clear” racist
origins of laws in Oregon and Louisiana allowing for criminal convictions
without jury unanimity). However, the Supreme Court has only rarely used
the terms “racist” or “racism,” and there is reason to be cautious about the
extent to which the Court is ready to fully engage in this reckoning. See
generally Kathryn Stanchi, The Rhetoric of Racism in the United States
Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

10.

See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text for the explanation of why
this article uses the term “racist prosecutorial rhetoric.”

11.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987).
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However, that statement was made in a footnote of a case that did not
specifically address prosecutorial misconduct. 12 The Court has never
squarely focused on racially biased prosecutorial arguments, so it has
not clarified how courts should analyze this issue. 13 While Justice
Sotomayor in 2013 rebuked a prosecutor for “tapp[ing] a deep and sorry
vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal
justice in our Nation,” she did so in an order denying certiorari.14 The
Court’s failure to take a case that squarely presents this issue has left
lower federal courts, state courts, and commentators struggling to
provide a useful framework for analyzing these issues, or even to
identify what part of the Constitution they violate.15
My earlier article on prosecutorial misconduct, Mitigating Foul
Blows, offered a framework to try to combat the “helpless piety”
displayed by courts when they are quick both to condemn prosecutorial
arguments as improper and to affirm resulting convictions based on
procedural doctrines such as harmless error.16 However, that article did
12.

Id. at 283–85 (McCleskey was about statistical evidence of racial bias in
death penalty cases; the court noted the prosecutor’s racially biased language
in passing but did not directly analyze that issue).

13.

McCleskey cited Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), for the
proposition that the Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial
arguments. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 n.30. But the dissent in a later case
noted that there were only two allegedly improper comments in the closing
in Donnelly, and one of those was ambiguous. Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168, 193 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Darden involved more racist
comments, but those comments were interwoven with other improper appeals.
See id. at 189–92 n.2. Neither Darden nor Donnelly directly confronted the
racial components of the comments, and both held that the trials were not so
infected with unfairness as to justify reversal of the convictions. Darden, 477
U.S. at 181–82; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645.

14.

Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 1206, 1206–08 (2017) (statement of
Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari)
(justifying the denial of certiorari given “the unusual way in which this
case has been litigated” and the defendant’s failure to raise the relevant
arguments before the circuit court, but clarifying that “I write to dispel
any doubt whether the Court’s denial of certiorari should be understood
to signal our tolerance of a federal prosecutor’s racially charged remark.
It should not.”).

15.

For example, Justice Sotomayor’s statement in the order denying
certiorari mentions three theories (equal protection, right to an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment, and the ABA Standards on Prosecution
and Defense Function), but only gives a single sentence about each one.
Id. at 1207–08. Commentators generally focus on equal protection, right
to an impartial jury, and the due process clause’s guarantee of a fair trial.
See, e.g., Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for
Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice
During Trial, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 319, 320 (2001).

16.

Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 309, 352
(2015) (quoting United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631,
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not address whether racist prosecutorial rhetoric should be treated
differently than other types of prosecutorial misconduct. This article
concludes that it should.17
More specifically, this article relies on social science research to
argue that courts should reevaluate their analysis of prosecutorial
appeals to race, and this article focuses on trial courts for solutions.
Specifically, Part I provides foundational information needed to
understand racist prosecutorial rhetoric and summarizes social science
research on how race affects decision-making. 18 Part II explains the
inadequate state of current law. It describes modern case law demon–
strating that prosecutors are using racist rhetoric, 19 explores the
disconnect between the social science research and courts’ treatment of
that rhetoric, and describes the courts’ procedural barriers to relief that
actually incentivize rather than discourage racist prosecutorial
rhetoric.20
661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting)); see generally id. at 362–73
(arguing for changes to appellate court review of prosecutorial misconduct
claims, such as using an error-focused rather than a guilt-focused approach
to harmless error analysis, looking at what effect the improper argument
was likely to have had on the trial rather than on the strength of the other
evidence against the defendant).
17.

Although the Court’s decision about racial bias in jury deliberations is not
directly applicable, the reasoning is relevant: “This Court’s decisions
demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and
institutional concerns.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868
(2017). The Court also stated that “there is a sound basis to treat racial
bias with added precautions. A constitutional rule that racial bias in the
justice system must be addressed . . . is necessary to prevent a systemic
loss of confidence in jury verdicts . . . .” Id. at 869.

18.

See generally Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision
Making, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 269, 271 (2015) (summarizing dozens
of studies showing how race affects jury decision-making); Lucy Jewel,
Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing
Alternatives, 76 Md. L. Rev. 663 (2017) (explaining how racist rhetoric
physically changes our brains through creation of toxic neural pathways, and
arguing that counternarratives can help create healing pathways, both
individually and collectively).

19.

Perhaps the most appalling example of racist prosecutorial rhetoric
involves analogizing Black defendants to animals, a practice that has been
repeatedly and recently upheld by the California state courts. See
generally Shana Heller, Dehumanization and Implicit Bias: Why Courts
Should Preclude References to Animal Imagery in Criminal Trials, 51
Crim. L. Bull. 870 (2015) (exploring the effects of prosecutors referring
to Black defendants with animal imagery).

20.

Bowman, supra note 16, at 315–16 (explaining that when prosecutors have
a strong case, then any misconduct is likely to be harmless; when prosecutors
have a weak case, the risk of acquittal is higher than the risk of an appellate
court ordering a new trial).
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Part III argues that trial courts, not appellate courts, should be the
focus for solutions to racist prosecutorial rhetoric. It also explains why
trial courts should focus specifically on prosecutors and provides an
overview of debiasing strategies. Part IV builds on this foundation by
offering specific solutions that trial courts should implement. That
section recommends using voir dire and early jury instructions to prime
jurors for egalitarianism rather than susceptibility to prejudice. Most
significantly, it argues that trial courts should aim to prevent racist
prosecutorial rhetoric through use of a checklist that would clarify what
rhetoric is absolutely prohibited and what rhetoric requires a case-bycase determination of appropriateness. Prosecutors would then need to
bring a motion in limine to facilitate those case-specific determinations.
Part IV also contains strategies for trial courts responding to problems
during trial and a method for tracking violators across multiple trials.
The combination of these solutions would help prevent racist pros–
ecutorial rhetoric and minimize harm when it occurs.

I.

How and Why is Racist Prosecutorial
Rhetoric So Problematic?

Racial bias “in the jury process can change the course of individual
lives, diminish confidence in the justice system, and have profound
effects on society.” 21 This section presents foundational information
needed to understand how racial bias can infect the jury process
through racist prosecutorial rhetoric. This section first provides an
overview of foundational concepts necessary for understanding racist
prosecutorial rhetoric. It then describes various ways in which racist
rhetoric affects decision-making.
A.

Overview of Foundational Concepts for Understanding
Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric

There can be no doubt at this point that racially-charged language
affects decision-making in a variety of contexts, including criminal
trials, although scholars debate how to conceptualize the way these
effects occur.22 Much of the legal scholarship over the last twenty or
21.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 283.

22.

Compare L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the
Criminal Courtroom, 126 Yale L.J. 862, 865 (2017) (“[R]esearch from the
past several decades reveals that implicit racial biases can influence the
behaviors and judgments of even the most consciously egalitarian individuals
in ways of which they are unaware and thus unable to control.”), with
Jonathan Kahn, Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets
Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Justice 67–68 (2018) (“[T]he
normalizing of implicit bias as common and pervasive . . . carries with it
the implication that explicit bias is abnormal, uncommon, and even
scientifically uninteresting” and that suggesting that explicit racism is a
thing of the past “allows us to ignore subtler or more nuanced forms of
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more years has focused on “implicit bias,” sometimes called
“unconscious racism.”23 Implicit biases “are composed of well-learned
associations that reside below conscious awareness and can auto–
matically drive behavior in a manner that is inconsistent with one’s
personal attitudes[,]” while “[e]xplicit biases are the beliefs that people
consciously possess and intentionally express . . . .”24 Other scholars,
however, argue that the current focus on implicit bias minimizes the
importance of overt or explicit bias and suggest that focusing too
heavily on implicit bias is part of the problematic but widespread view
that America is now “postracial.”25 Still other scholars reject a “rigid
dichotomy” between explicit and implicit biases, noting instead that
“implicit bias measures might be revealing concealed [but conscious]
beliefs rather than unconscious ones.”26
racism—or frankly any form of racist practice that does not look the same
as what came before.”).
23.

See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit
Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555 (2013); see
also Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 Vand. L. Rev.
297, 311 (1990) (“This paradox of irrationality and normalcy is part of the
reason for the unconscious nature of the racism. When our culture teaches
us to be racist and our ideology teaches us that racism is evil, we respond
by excluding the forbidden lesson from our consciousness.”).

24.

Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 228–29; see also Jerry Kang, Judge Mark
Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman,
Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1132 (2012)
(distinguishing explicit bias from implicit bias based on whether the attitudes
and beliefs involved are “consciously accessible through introspection”).

25.

See Kahn, supra note 22, at 66; see also id. at 67 (noting that this
minimization of explicit bias occurs in a variety of fields, including in
neuroscientific studies of implicit bias). Kahn also notes that this view of
overt expressions of prejudice being extreme and abnormal “hearkens oddly
back to the first wave of psychological research on prejudice from the 1920s
to the 1950s, which presented explicit prejudice as a pathological aberration
from normal thinking.” Id.; see also Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith &
Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial
Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 513, 564 (2014) (“One mild surprise in our results, however, was that
explicit bias matters too. Even though the days of rampant and overt racism
are mostly gone, our study shows that it is still valuable to monitor explicit
racial bias, at least in capital cases.”).

26.

Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative,
50 Ariz. St. L.J. 193, 198, 211 (2018); see also id. at 214–15 (“[W]hen [an]
individual denies a racial motive we cannot know if she is being honest or
whether she is simply and consciously concealing her own discrimination. It
also might be the case that although the person was truly unaware of the
operational bias, with a little effort she may have been able to access that
bias, in other words, it need not be an all or nothing proposition.”); Jessica
A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 505, 521–22 (2018) (discussing
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This article does not seek to resolve these broader debates. Instead,
it takes the position that each of these approaches, as well as others
discussed below, provide meaningful lenses through which to under–
stand how and why racist prosecutorial rhetoric affects criminal trials.
Despite the common tendency to rely on sweeping characterizations,
“attitudes and beliefs about race have long been internally complex and
have only become more so . . . .” 27 This article therefore discusses
both the cognitive states of individual actors and the larger structural
racism issues.28
This article also focuses on strategies for controlling and minimizing
the effects of bias, regardless of whether that bias is implicit or explicit.
Some scholars critique implicit bias scholarship as wrongly suggesting
that implicit bias is uncontrollable, when in fact social psychology
research provides several effective strategies for controlling implicit
bias.29 Furthermore, research indicates that treating bias as unconscious
makes it easier for people to avoid taking responsibility for controlling
their biases.30 Thus, this article uses the term “implicit bias” rather
than “unconscious bias” to help create the foundation for concrete
actions to mitigate these biases, and it draws on the extensive social
science research that provides tools for doing so.
Furthermore, in exploring these issues, the focus must be on racist
rhetoric, not racist prosecutors—i.e., on the language used rather than
on the moral culpability of the person using those words. Beyond
sidestepping the broader debate about explicit bias versus concealedbut-conscious bias versus implicit bias, this approach reflects the idea
evidence that people are aware of but underreport their explicit biases);
Gregory Mitchell, An Implicit Bias Primer, 25 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 27,
42–45 (2018) (noting that “presently the empirical data do not allow
researchers to declare whether implicit bias and explicit bias are truly
distinct” and then describing the ambiguities in the empirical research).
27.

Kahn, supra note 22, at 70 (quoting Lawrence D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles,
Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama
Candidacy, 621 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 243, 244 (2009)).

28.

See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241, 1280 (2002)
(“[D]iscrimination is a product not only of stereotyping and psychological
prejudice, but also of institutional structures and practices through which
individual attitudes and behavior play out.”). A July 2020 survey of judges
through the National Judicial College reveals that most judges (65% of
those who responded) “believe that systemic racism exists in the criminal
justice system.” Anna-Leigh Firth, Most Judges Believe the Criminal
Justice System Suffers from Racism, The National Judicial College
(July 14, 2020), https://www.judges.org/ (search title in search bar; then
follow hyperlink of title) [https://perma.cc/SVW9-WM6U].

29.

Selmi, supra note 26, at 197–98.

30.

Id. at 218.
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that people more easily recognize speech as racist, even when they
would not use that label for the speaker.31 Additionally, focusing on the
speaker rather than the words used would echo the problems with the
application of Batson v. Kentucky32 regarding jury selection; scholars
have rightly argued that Batson has been ineffective in part because
the court has to essentially conclude that the prosecutor was being
racist, rather than focus on the prosecutor’s actions.33 Here, focusing on
the person would necessarily require a focus on the prosecutor’s intent,
which generally only allows courts to address overt rather than subtle
references to race.34 Moreover, remedying structural racism requires a
focus on the harm caused rather than on whether someone intended
that harm.35 And as explained in more detail below, significant harm
can come from the prosecutor’s rhetoric, regardless of the prosecutor’s
intent.36
31.

See Kahn, supra note 22, at 70 (describing several examples where people
were willing to call remarks but not speakers racist and noting that “even
bigots can be conflicted about their racist attitudes”).

32.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

33.

See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations,
118 Colum. L. Rev. 713, 720–21 (2018) (“According to this critique, the
awkwardness of branding the prosecutor racist raises the stakes for all
involved and is another impediment to finding a Batson violation.”); Nancy
S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the
Peremptory Challenge, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1137, 1184 (2017) (noting that
the court “would essentially be calling them liars or racists”). Another related
problem with Batson is that prosecutors may not realize the effect that
stereotypes may have shaped their perception of the reasons for the strike:
“When asked to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike, the attorney
may sincerely believe that she struck the prospective juror for reasons not
related to the juror’s race, even though implicit racial bias may have in fact
influenced the attorney’s perceptions of the individual.” Cynthia Lee, A New
Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 843, 851
(2015).

34.

See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Earle, Note: Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An
Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 Colum. L.
Rev. 1212, 1227–29 (1992).

35.

See, e.g., Gilbert C. Gee & Chandra L. Ford, Structural Racism and
Health Inequities: Old Issues, New Directions, 8 Du Bois Rev. 115 (2011)
(defining structural racism as “as the macrolevel systems, social forces,
institutions, ideologies, and processes that interact with one another to
generate and reinforce inequities among racial and ethnic groups.”).

36.

See, e.g., Jewel, supra note 18, at 664 (“The harmful rhetoric used to describe
racial minorities and other subordinated groups produces toxic thought
patterns that can become entrenched in the public mind.”); Bilotta et al.,
supra note 4, at 229 (“It is important to note that the subtle discrimination
that emerges as a result of implicit biases is just as harmful as overt discrim–
ination, if not more so, because the target is more likely to internalize the
experience than to discount it as discrimination.”); State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d
1213, 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] prosecutor’s mental state, however
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Rhetoric can be defined narrowly as the art of persuasion or a
process for discovering the truth by argumentation, but also can more
broadly include “language, conversation, words, and even images”
involved in persuasive communication. 37 “Modern rhetoric is also
interdisciplinary, engaging with social and scientific theories to under–
stand how people are persuaded.” 38 Theories of rhetoric explain the
effectiveness of appeals to stereotypes,39 and courts have often allowed
prosecutors to use these appeals without consequence. 40 This article
uses the terms “racist rhetoric” or “racist prosecutorial rhetoric” to
mean these appeals to racial stereotypes, whether deployed consciously
or unconsciously.41 This rhetoric is racist, regardless of the individual
prosecutor’s intent in using it, because of the likelihood of triggering
racial stereotypes in those who hear it.42
innocent, does not determine the message received by the jurors or their
individual responses to it.”).
37.

Jewel, supra note 18, at 665.

38.

Id. at 666.

39.

Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming
the Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 325, 327 (2006).

40.

See generally id. (discussing methods counsel can use in an appeal when
the trial was tarnished by the use of racial stereotypes).

41.

See Earle, supra note 34, at 1214 n.11 (using the term “prosecutorial racism”
“as a shorthand for arguments, unconscious or intentional, that pose the dan–
ger of evoking impermissible and irrelevant racial considerations in the minds
of jurors.”). Earle’s use of “prosecutorial racism” is similar to my preferred
“racist prosecutorial rhetoric” in that it does not focus on intent, although I
think it is also important to include the idea of rhetoric in framing the problem.
Cf. Alford, supra note 39, at 326–27 (discussing “racist summations” as
including “indirect . . . [rather than explicitly biased] yet highly inflammatory”
language while arguing that the “indirect” racism displayed can be argued to
be intentional given its similarities to classical rhetoric techniques). I agree
with Alford about the similarity of modern racist prosecutorial rhetoric to
classical rhetorical techniques, but I recommend avoiding focusing on whether
the use of that rhetoric is intentional. See also Stanchi, supra note 9, at Part
II (discussing the rhetorical power of the words “racist” and “racism” that are
lacking in “softer” alternatives).

42.

See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An
Introduction 183 (3rd ed. 2017) (defining racism—without an intent
requirement—as “any program or practice of discrimination, segregation,
persecution, or mistreatment based on membership in a race or ethnic
group”); see also Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 1, 28 (2019) (“The common feature that connects racism
across countries and spaces is its role in advancing a social hierarchy that
places some people at the bottom and others at the top based on constructed
racial categories. This hierarchy of racial ideology perpetuates a power
structure that becomes embedded in law, politics, economic activity, and
culture.”); see also infra Section I(B) regarding the effect of race on juror
decision-making, including how racist rhetoric exacerbates underlying biases.
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Racist rhetoric is problematic when used by anyone in a criminal
trial, but it is particularly problematic given prosecutors’ special role in
the criminal justice system. Prosecutors are supposed to serve as
representatives of the people, not as the representative of crime victims,
and “the prosecutor’s primary responsibility is to the administration of
justice, not just winning cases.” 43 This special role undergirds the
Supreme Court’s famous exhortation that while prosecutors “may strike
hard blows, [they are] not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
[their] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one.”44 Courts need to make this exhortation meaningful given
modern research showing that jurors’ explicit and implicit biases tend
to favor the prosecution in criminal trials.45 One step toward ridding
the criminal justice system of racial bias involves understanding how
racist prosecutorial rhetoric activates juror biases.
Racist prosecutorial rhetoric also harms communities of color.
Professor Anthony Alfieri notes that when racialized narratives are
brought into criminal trials, “they apply a juridical gloss to such images
and tropes, restyling popular meaning by force of law. . . . Not only
do they translate social meaning into law, but they also construct social
meaning out of law.” 46 Furthermore, he discusses the harms to
communities of color that can occur from problematic racial narratives,
such as the denigration of individuals’ experiences and communities, as
well as a loss of faith in the system.47 Alfieri therefore urges a “new
ethic of prosecution” that is “respectful of the dignity of racial identity
and the integrity of racial community.”48 This article joins that call.

43.

Lyon, supra note 15, at 335.

44.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). “This exhortation . . . is
frequently cited by courts reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
defense counsel raising those claims, and academics commenting on
prosecutorial behavior.” Bowman, supra note 16, at 312.

45.

Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1503, 1529 (2015) (noting that explicit biases include
widespread beliefs that “prosecutors are unimpeachable . . . and that the
presumption of innocence is a fiction”; implicit biases “tend to disfavor people
of color, and thus a disproportionate number of criminal defendants” in ways
that “can affect all of the main tasks that jurors are called on to perform”).

46.

Alfieri, supra note 3, at 2229.

47.

Id. at 2240. While Alfieri was specifically talking about the Central Park
Jogger case, his critique is appliable more broadly. Alfieri also notes that both
the law and narrative tradition and critical race theory demonstrate the need
for rethinking the use of stereotypes, among other longstanding traditions in
prosecutorial practices. See id. at 2229–30.

48.

Id. at 2241–42.
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B.

How Race Affects Juror Decision-Making

“[M]ost participants in the criminal justice system believe that they
can make fair and unbiased decisions, but data continue to show results
markedly differentiated by race.” 49 The last several decades have
produced extensive social science research on how race affects jury
decision-making. 50 This section does not purport to exhaustively
summarize that research; instead, it explores findings and themes from
this research that provide a helpful context51 for understanding how
decision-making can be affected by racist prosecutorial rhetoric.52
1.

Ingroup versus Outgroup Bias

One important way that race affects decision-making is through
ingroup versus outgroup bias. Ingroup bias “occurs when people make
more positive judgments about individuals who belong to the same
49.

Praatika Prasad, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations:
Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 3091, 3095–96
(2018) (citing Achieving an Impartial Jury (AIJ) Toolbox, Am. Bar Ass’n,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljusti
ce/voirdire_toolchest.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGJ7-BPBV]).
While not directly relevant to the topic of this article, there is particularly
disturbing research on “shooter bias” and “weapon perception,” which shows
through a variety of experiments that people are both quicker to shoot and
more likely to mis-identify a non-weapon as a weapon for Black rather than
white individuals, regardless of whether they display explicit biases. See, e.g.,
Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 230–31 (summarizing multiple studies). But
see Selmi, supra note 26, at 204–05 (discussing conflicting studies on “shooter
bias” and stating that “even if one accepts that there is a shooter bias, there
is no clear reason to conclude that the bias is implicit rather than explicit.”).

50.

This research includes both experimental studies (using mock juries and
some divergence from trial practices in order to more precisely test the role
of race in decision-making) and review of decisions in actual cases. See Hunt,
supra note 18, at 271 (concluding that together, these methods “provide
converging evidence that race and ethnicity influence jury decisions and
trial outcomes”); Selmi, supra note 26, at 233 (discussing the value of both
laboratory studies that attempt to isolate facets of discrimination beyond
what is possible in real world activities, and field studies that allow
researchers to “test their theories in actual settings” and therefore “provide
more compelling evidence of the pervasiveness of discrimination”).

51.

In other words, most of the social science research discussed below involves
studies that do not involve prosecutorial rhetoric in criminal cases. But the
results of these studies still provide the backdrop against which prosecutors’
racist rhetoric becomes particularly likely to impact jury decision-making.

52.

See Hunt, supra note 18, at 277 (discussing that while these different
mechanisms can have an explicit component most social scientists believe
that “these processes tend to be subtle, if not wholly implicit, making them
difficult for jurors to recognize and control.”). That means that jurors may
genuinely believe that they are basing their judgments on the evidence and
complying with jury instructions, while in fact their decisions are being
influenced by racial biases in ways they fail to recognize or remedy.
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social category simply because of shared group membership.”53 Out–
group bias, on the other hand, involves negative judgments against
individuals who are not part of the same group.54
This dynamic is exemplified in the social science research showing
that “jurors tend to make more lenient judgments of same-race
defendants and harsher judgments of other-race defendants.” 55 One
study related to this theory showed that white jurors rated the
culpability of Black defendants more strongly than white defendants
when the evidence was ambiguous; given the frequency of plea bargains
in criminal cases, that study likely mirrors many real-life trials.56 It also
helps explain the fact that the tendency for jurors to more harshly judge
defendants of a different race or ethnicity is particularly pronounced in
non-capital cases; 57 while non-capital cases with strong evidence are
often pled, capital cases with similar strength of evidence may go to
trial because of the penalty consequences.58 That may explain why in
capital cases, the race of the victim is more important than the race of
the defendant in predicting when the defendant will receive the death
penalty.59 This finding may also relate to research on Aversive Racism
Theory, which shows that people try to avoid bias when they are aware
53.

Id. at 275 (citation omitted).

54.

See id. at 276; cf. Maureen Johnson, Separate But (Un)equal: Why
Institutionalized Anti-Racism is the Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 327, 378 (2018) (quoting Terry
Smith, White Backlash in a Brown Country, 50 Val. U. L. Rev. 89, 98
(2015)) (discussing scholars, including psychologists, who hypothesize that
racism goes beyond simple outgroup bias and also includes a component of
“addiction” to the privileges of power for those in the dominant cultural
group).

55.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 274 (citation omitted); see also id. at 271 (discussing
dozens of experimental studies and two meta-analyses synthesizing the
research confirming this pattern, which “often is referred to as the similarityleniency effect”).

56.

Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors Racial Biases: The Effects of
Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 Yale L.J. 1690, 1708
(2015) (noting that when the evidence is strong, prosecutors often seek a
plea bargain, and when the evidence is weak, defense counsel often seek a
plea bargain).

57.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 273.

58.

See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
475, 481 (2013) (discussing how plea bargaining is “theoretically ambiguous”
in terms of its effect on the death penalty and how prosecutors may not offer
desirable plea deals to defendants who have been charged with capital
punishment).

59.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 273. Additionally, “racial bias in death sentencing
is stronger among White male jurors . . . . Black defendants are 41% more
likely to receive the death penalty when juries include five or more White
men.” Id.
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of its potential effect.60 Research shows that jurors do a better job of
guarding against the influence of prejudice when race is treated as
salient than when they do not see race as salient.61 Thus, when race is
not treated as salient, then white jurors’ implicit biases often play a
role, but biased decision-making is reduced when race is made salient.62
In non-capital cases, white jurors may be less likely to see race as
significant, so they may be less likely to control their outgroup biases
against defendants of color.63
Another example of the ingroup versus outgroup bias dynamic
involves “attributions, that is, explanations about the causes of behav–
ior.”64 Research shows that white jurors are more likely to attribute
petty crime by white juveniles to “succumbing to peer pressure in the
moment,” while the same jurors are more likely to attribute the same
act by a Black juvenile as being “destructive and defiant.”65 In the
death penalty context, “White jurors, especially men,” were more likely
to view defendants as “vicious and dangerous individuals who made
their victims suffer” while Black male jurors were more likely to view
defendants with empathy and “to believe that the defendant is
remorseful.”66 These attribution distinctions are particularly pronoun–

60.

Id. at 275; see also Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1695–96 (noting that
aversive racism theory explains behavior of those who are “high in implicit
racism, yet low in explicit racism—in other words, they are biased but are
unaware of their biases.”).

61.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (summarizing various studies); see also Samuel
R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions
of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 1367, 1371 (2000) (noting that “for a run-of-the-mill case in which
the defendant happens to be Black” race isn’t perceived by jurors as salient
in the same way that they do when racial issues are more obviously central
to a case).

62.

Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1696; see also id. at 1698–99 (arguing that
traditional definitions of race salience, which require race to be “central”
to the trial, are too narrow and that instead subtle references to race can
also debias juror responses).

63.

See Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion of
Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 2018 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1243, 1281
(2018) (explaining that in capital offenses the Supreme Court has stated
that a “defendant has [a] right to request that prospective jurors be
informed of the race of the victim and questioned regarding their potential
race biases”); see also id. at 1282–83 (explaining that the Supreme Court
later stated that this rule did not apply in a case where “the crime was
victimless and nonviolent”).

64.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 275.

65.

Id. at 276 (citation omitted).

66.

Id. at 280 (citation omitted).
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ced “when a criminal act is stereotypically associated with a defendant’s
racial or ethnic group.”67
2.

The Power of Stereotypes

Stereotypes play a powerful role in influencing decision-making.
Stereotypes are the well-connected “associations among groups and
traits established in children’s memories at an early age, before they
have the cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal
acceptability of the stereotypes.”68 These associations come at least in
part from cultural forces and images, and they can be reinforced and
strengthened in a variety of ways. 69 The associations affect actions
through stereotyping “when judgments are influenced by beliefs about
the characteristics of people in a particular category (e.g., racial
group).”70
Stereotypes can involve ostensibly positive beliefs, such as the
“Asian as model minority” 71 association or the stereotype of Black
women as “everyone’s favorite aunt or grandmother, . . . ready to

67.

Id. at 276 (citation omitted).

68.

Thompson, supra note 63, at 1248 (quoting Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 Cal.
L. Rev. 733, 741 (1995)); see also Armour, supra, at 742 (using the same
definition of stereotypes and distinguishing them from prejudice, which
means “derogatory personal beliefs”). Armour notes that “some people’s
stereotypes and personal beliefs overlap; that is, some people not only have
knowledge of the cultural stereotypes from years of socialization, but they
endorse and accept them as well.” Id.

69.

See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1252 (noting that “racial and ethnic
stereotypes are part and parcel of American culture”); Pamela Wilkins,
Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 305, 324–25
(2012) (discussing studies showing that media focus, particularly in local
news broadcasts, give more airtime to crime committed by Black people
and portraying them as more threatening than white criminals, which
contributes to political rhetoric, combining to strengthen the association of
Black people with crime); Richardson, supra note 22, at 881 (noting that
“[f]illing criminal courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of color
will likely strengthen the already ubiquitous conscious and unconscious
association linking people of color with crime” and that even if lawyers and
judges “understand on an intellectual level that this disproportionate
representation is the predictable result of focusing law enforcement efforts
on communities of color”).

70.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. Hunt distinguishes stereotypes from the
related but distinct concept of prejudice. “In contrast, prejudice involves
negative attitudes or evaluations (e.g., feelings of dislike) toward a social
category.” Id. Stereotypes can be either positive or negative associations,
but prejudices always involve negative characterizations. See id. at 280.

71.

Thompson, supra note 63, at 1252.
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soothe everyone’s hurt . . . .” 72 However, even so-called positive
stereotypes can have significant negative impacts on decision-making.73
More commonly, however, stereotypes are negative, such as the
association of Latinos with illegal immigration or Black people with
crime.74 Other research shows stereotypes of Black people as dishonest,
violent, and less intelligent than whites.75 These negative stereotypes
are used to rationalize prejudice and justify harsh treatment of others.76
For example, during slavery, the association of enslaved peoples with
animals was used to justify barnlike housing conditions.77
Courts have for decades treated as unlawful intentional discrim–
ination invoking stereotypes to justify decision-making. 78 Professor
Michael Selmi describes an interview study gauging employers’
attitudes about race in which many interviewees referred to a perceived
lack of work ethic and a “‘perceived threatening or criminal demeanor’
of Black men.” 79 Selmi noted that these statements attempting to
justify behavior based on stereotype would easily establish legal liability
for discrimination. 80 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
recently treated as “overt racial bias” a juror’s argument for the defen–

72.

Id. at 1251 (quoting Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra
and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment of African American Women
in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. Gender, Race & Just. 625, 635–
36 (2000)).

73.

Id. at 1252.

74.

Id. at 1248.

75.

Id. at 1261–62.

76.

Johnson, supra note 54, at 374 (emphasis omitted).

77.

Id. at 375.

78.

See Selmi, supra note 26, at 199 (noting that when a police officer associates
young Black men with criminal activity or when a school principal treats
disciplinary issues differently depending on the race of the child involved,
“[t]hese behaviors may be influenced by unconscious attitudes, but the
behavior itself is deliberate and intentional and fits easily within standard
legal doctrines”); id. at 241–45 (discussing a variety of legal contexts in
which courts have explicitly relied on stereotyping to find unlawful
discrimination, regardless of whether those stereotypes involved conscious
versus unconscious biases).

79.

Id. at 240–41 (discussing and quoting Devah Pager & Diana Karafin,
Bayesian Bigot? Statistical Discrimination, Stereotypes, and Employer
Decision Making, 621 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 70, 77, 82
(2009)).

80.

Id. at 241 (also noting that respondents acknowledged that they knew
individuals who did not fit the stereotype, and that the “principal harm of
stereotyping [is that] the group judgments are exaggerated and overbroad.”).
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dant’s guilt in a sexual assault case by explicitly referencing multiple
stereotypes of Mexican men mistreating women.81
Stereotypes can also affect decision-making in a variety of more
subtle ways, including soothing the cognitive dissonance that would
otherwise result from significant structural inequities.82 The psycho–
logical theory of cognitive dissonance says that humans feel great
discomfort when trying to maintain two conflicting beliefs, so to
alleviate that discomfort, we unknowingly move ourselves into a state
of denial about the less-significant of the two beliefs. 83 Frequently,
rather than simply denying information that conflicts with our domin–
ant belief, we make ourselves feel better by “strongly lash[ing] out
against the competing belief, convincing ourselves that it is dead wrong
and must be soundly defeated.” 84 Cognitive dissonance thus helps
explain why police and prosecutors often come up with “outlandish
theories” of guilt in response to DNA evidence exonerating someone
convicted of a crime; these police and prosecutors have an internalized
view of being fighters for justice that makes it very difficult to accept
that they could have contributed to a wrongful conviction.85 Stereo–
types facilitate that process, helping individuals rationalize prejudices
and avoid guilt.86 And modern research has shown that stereotypes are
particularly likely to affect decision-making when an individual is “not
motivated to seek individuating information about members of stereo–
typed groups” and when an individual is “under stress or . . . pressed
for time.”87 In those circumstances, both of which are common in the
81.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires
that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to
consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of
the jury trial guarantee.”).

82.

Johnson, supra note 54, at 374.

83.

Mark Godsey, Blind Injustice: A Former Prosecutor Exposes the
Psychology and Politics of Wrongful Convictions 18 (2017).

84.

Id.; see also id. at 18–19 (discussing how this theory helps explain how
many ordinary Germans, particularly those closer in the hierarchy to the
concentration camps, fully adopted the Nazi position “in order to internally
justify their actions and avoid dissonance”).

85.

Id. at 20.

86.

Johnson, supra note 54, at 374 (emphasis omitted). This process may also
help explain the way that people who believe in equality nevertheless
rationalize the racial disproportionalities within the criminal justice system.

87.

Thompson, supra note 63, at 1249. This description of conditions that lead
to an increased role for implicit biases echoes the “situation of pressurized
decision making by all courtroom actors as systematic triage.” Richardson,
supra note 22, at 878 (footnote omitted) (“[E]xcessive caseloads impact
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges alike, creating pressure on each of
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criminal justice system, people rely less on logic and more on mental
shortcuts.88
Additionally, research shows crucial connections between the
nature of the crime and racial stereotypes. Studies show that when news
stories on violent crime omit the race of the perpetrator, the majority
of white audience members assumes that the perpetrator was Black.89
“Jurors are more likely to render guilty verdicts and recommend harsh
sentences when defendants are accused of committing crimes that are
stereotypically associated with their racial or ethnic group.” 90 For
example, judgment and sentencing decisions tend to be harsher when
white defendants are accused of financial crimes such as embezzlement
or fraud, while Black defendants face harsher outcomes than white
defendants for theft and violent crimes. 91 This affect seems to be
“especially strong for serious and violent crimes.”92 Additional research
suggests that stereotypes affect information processing and memory.
“[I]ndividuals who are impacted by stereotypes do a better job of
processing stereotype-consistent information as compared to stereotypeinconsistent information.”93 Regarding memory, “stereotypes facilitate
the way the brain stores and processes information”; when people
attempt to recall “hazy” memories, they often fill in those memories
with stereotypes. 94 Consequently, “people often recall stereotypeconsistent information more easily than stereotype-inconsistent infor–
mation.”95
Stereotypes likely interact with ingroup versus outgroup biases as
well. For example, some research shows that jurors tend to be less
suspicious of witnesses who share their identity and more skeptical of
those who do not.96 This effect was particularly pronounced for white
these courtroom actors to engage in triage—the process of allocating scarce
resources.”).
88.

Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 229.

89.

Alford, supra note 39, at 345; see also id. (discussing other studies that
reveal the stereotypical association of Black people with violence and
hostility, a stereotype that “is associated with fear and loathing” and is
“likely to be a strong motivating force” when activated through racist
prosecutorial rhetoric in closing argument).

90.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 275.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Thompson, supra note 63, at 1262.

94.

Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 376 (2007).

95.

Id. at 376–77.

96.

Thompson, supra note 63, at 1262.
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jurors being skeptical of the credibility of Black witnesses, including
white jurors who reported low levels of prejudice.97 Researchers linked
this skepticism to stereotypes of Black dishonesty.98
3.

Priming for Prejudice

Additionally, understanding how racist prosecutorial rhetoric works
requires understanding the related concepts of prejudice and priming.
“[P]rejudice involves negative attitudes or evaluations (e.g., feelings of
dislike) toward a social category.”99 Much of the recent implicit bias
research focuses on how these negative attitudes are activated through
“priming,” which involves presenting information in ways that trigger
associations with other ideas.100 Our brains interpret new information
by fitting it into existing categories, particularly categories that have
been recently accessed, and “[p]riming is a way of influencing the
categories that are at the forefront of our brains.”101
In experimental research studies using priming, researchers expose
participants to stimuli and then measure their responses. 102 For
example, studies show differences in voting patterns depending on the
location of the voting place (e.g. higher approval of school bonds when
voting in a school rather than another location) and higher reports of
conservative social attitudes when questioned about these attitudes in
front of a cathedral versus a government building.103 In many priming
studies, however, participants are unaware of the “primes” because they
are flashed on a screen too quickly to be consciously perceived.104 Even

97.

Id.

98.

See id. at 1261–62.

99.

Hunt, supra note 18, at 275. Hunt distinguishes between prejudice, which
is always negative, and stereotyping, which can be positive or negative, as
explained above. Id.

100. Linda L. Berger & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Legal Persuasion: A
Rhetorical Approach to the Science 105 (2018); see also id. at 107
(noting that our brains have so many categories in them but tend to use
categories that were recently activated when processing new information).
101. Id.; see also Karenna F. Malavanti, Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt
& Charles A. Weaver, III, Subtle Contextual Influences on Racial Bias in
the Courtroom, 24 Am. Soc’y Trial Consultants 2, 5 (2012) (defining
priming as “the unconscious influence of individuals’ environmental cues
on their behaviors.”).
102. See Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Koichi Hioki, Race and Retribution:
An Empirical Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 839, 873 (2019).
103. Malavanti et al., supra note 101, at 4.
104. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 1248 (“If people are shown an image on a
screen for a few milliseconds, followed immediately by a ‘masking’ image,
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when participants were unaware of the stimuli, those stimuli con–
sistently produced prejudiced results involving both attitudes and
decision-making.105
For example, social science research shows that priming for race
can affect interpretation of ambiguous facts. 106 In one study, the
researcher “presented a set of ambiguous facts to participants after
priming them with stereotypes of African Americans,” then asked them
to judge the person’s ambiguous behavior.107 “Participants who were
primed with more [negative] stereotypes judged the person’s ambiguous
behavior more harshly than participants who were primed with fewer
stereotypes.”108
Similarly, a recent empirical study by Professor Justin Levinson
showed that race sometimes affects how jurors remember facts.109 In
that study, “for some facts, simply altering a legal actor’s race caused
participants to remember certain facts or generate false memories in
racially biased ways.”110 Study participants read a “confrontation” story
describing circumstances surrounding a fistfight, were then given a
short distracting task, and then were asked questions about their
memories of the story.111 The facts of the story were identical except for
the race of the protagonist: “participants read about either William, a
Caucasian man, Tyronne, an African-American man, or Kawika, a
Hawaiian man.”112

they will behave in ways that reflect their having seen the first image, but
without any conscious awareness of having seen it . . . .”).
105. See, e.g., Anders Kaye, Schematic Psychology and Criminal Responsibility,
83 St. John’s L. Rev. 565, 577 (2009) (summarizing priming studies); see
also Wilkins, supra note 69, at 322 (quoting Justin D. Levinson, Race,
Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 599, 632 (2009))
(brackets in original) (noting that priming one stereotype of a group can
activate other stereotypes as well: “For example, a group primed with
violent rap music, which primed stereotypes of black males as aggressive
and violent, ‘were more likely than other participants to judge a Black job
applicant as less qualified for a job requiring intelligence’ [lower intelligence
being another stereotype pertaining to blacks].”).
106. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1267–71.
107. Id. at 1267–68.
108. Id.
109. Levinson, supra note 94, at 350.
110. Id. at 351.
111. Id. at 391.
112. Id. at 394. Levinson also used the same methodology with a story involving
an employment dispute. Id. “Participants exhibited better memories for the
employment scenario than for [t]he [c]onfrontation,” perhaps because the
confrontation story “contained more racially stereotypical facts.” Id. at 402–
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With this one change, Levinson found multiples ways in which
“[s]ystematic errors in recall affected participants’ memories of [t]he
[c]onfrontation in a manner harmful to African Americans, and to a
lesser extent, to Hawaiians.” 113 For example, participants more
successfully recalled “aggressive facts” when they read about Tyronne
as compared to William.114 The study also showed a “false memory
effect” for one fact related to aggression, with more participants who
read about people of color falsely remembering a “fact” about the
person’s aggression. 115 And while Levinson did not find statistically
significant differences in recall of mitigation facts for those reading
about William compared to Tyronne, he did find that those who read
about Kawika were more likely to falsely remember mitigating facts.116
Levinson’s research is consistent with earlier studies outside the
race context that indicate that rhetorical choices about language can
similarly affect memory. Multiple studies of memory demonstrated that
people given information about a car accident remembered the car going
significantly faster when the accident description used the word
“smashed” compared to “contacted” or “hit.”117 And when asked a week
later whether the accident scene photos had included broken glass,
those who had seen the word “smashed” were more likely to falsely
remember the presence of broken glass.118
Emotions also play a significant role in priming for retribution.
“When a decision-maker feels fear, anger, or both, the need for
retribution automatically becomes heightened.”119 Fear and anger are
03. In other words, the memory effects link back to stereotype consistency
discussed in the prior section.
113. Id. at 398 (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 398–99.
115. Id. at 400–01 (while 56% of participants who read about William falsely
remembered a fact showing William as the aggressor, that number rose to
70% for those reading about Tyronne or Kawika).
116. Id. at 401. These memory biases seem to operate unconsciously; Levinson
noted that “participants who manifested more memory bias were not more
likely to be explicitly biased.” Id. at 404. However, he found one example
where that was not true—one instance where participants who read about
William and had higher explicit bias and higher memory bias. Id. at 406
n.284. He also found two counterintuitive examples, where participants who
read about Tyronne or Kawika were actually more likely to misremember
if they had low levels of explicit bias. Id. at 404.
117. Godsey, supra note 83, at 121.
118. Id. at 121–22. That was true even if at the time they had not incorrectly
inflated the car’s speed after seeing that characterization. Id. at 122.
119. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 854; see also Berger & Stanchi,
supra note 100, at 110 (noting that “when [someone] experiences anger, .
. . the emotion tends to reinforce the desire to blame someone, anyone,”

59

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

both intensified by racial stereotypes. 120 Stereotypes also lessen
empathy, particularly when connected to dehumanization.121 Dehum–
anization occurs when people view other people “as less than human
and thus not deserving of moral consideration.” 122 “As a matter of
history, social fact[,] and even neuroscience . . . people tend to react
to criminals by dehumanizing them.” 123 This dehumanization makes
people more likely to justify violence. For example, one study showed
that when participants were primed with the word “ape,” they were
more likely to conclude that use of force was justified in a video showing
police officers severely and repeatedly striking a Black suspect after the
conclusion of a car chase.124
Dehumanizing rhetoric can play an important role in priming for
emotion, with devastating consequences. For instance, our current
mass-incarceration epidemic was shaped in part by “pundits and
professors alike warning . . . of a ‘new breed’ of merciless juvenile
‘superpredators’ and the horrors of ‘crack babies.’”125 Levinson argues
that this dehumanizing rhetoric played on fear and anger in a racialized
way, creating a “moral panic” that has led to hundreds of thousands of
Americans imprisoned for decades “based on baseless legislative
assumptions.”126
while sadness tends to make people “attribute the events that occurred to
the overall situation rather than to human actions”).
120. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 868.
121. Id. at 868–69.
122. Godsey, supra note 83, at 39 (internal quotation omitted). Godsey notes
that dehumanizing racial slurs helped slave-owners justify their actions
and that both sides in World War II used racial slurs in propaganda. Id.
“Racism in any form involves dehumanization.” Id.
123. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 869. There is a broader issue with
prosecutors’ offices having a culture that dehumanizes criminal defendants
that prosecutors should take seriously. See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 83,
at 39–52 (describing personal experience as both a prosecutor and as an
attorney on an innocence project facing dehumanization of criminal
defendants).
124. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 869–70.
125. Id. at 843. While that rhetoric is not as explicitly dehumanizing as directly
calling someone an ape, words like “breed” and “superpredator” invoke
animal imagery. See also Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 45 (discus–
sing the “superpredator” metaphor and the briefs in a recent Supreme Court
case demonstrating that the superpredator metaphor was also myth).
126. Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 843. This analysis came from an article
discussing Levinson’s recent study showing that race and retribution have
become inextricably linked. “The study found that participants more
strongly associated Black faces with the concepts of retribution, payback,
and revenge, and White faces with the concepts of rehabilitation, treatment,
and redemption.” Id. at 844; see also Lee, supra note 33, at 863–66 (summar–
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Regarding criminal trials, one scholar notes that prosecutors “from
the time of Cicero until the present” have used the technique of
“othering” defendants “as someone outside of the moral community” to
“induce a negative emotional response towards the defendant.”127 This
technique also plays on jurors’ emotions by situating the prosecutor on
the same side of the moral line as the jurors, which helps the jury see
the prosecutor as trustworthy.128 Modern cognitive psychology research
thus confirms the insights of early rhetoricians about how othering and
stereotyping affects perception.129
The role of rhetoric in priming to activate stereotypes is significant,
as research on implicit bias indicates that something is needed to trigger
the power of a stereotype for people who do not harbor explicit biases.130
The “existence of stereotypes or caricatures in the mind of the audience
is often not enough to produce the motivating response. Rather, the
speaker may need to shape his discourse to call forth these cognitive
constructs in the minds of the listeners.”131
But the prosecutor’s language doesn’t have to directly refer to a
stereotype to activate the juror’s mental association. For example, a
prosecutor could refer to the defendant’s actions, rather than the
defendant himself, as “animalistic, brutal, and impulsive[,]” which will
“bring forth the caricature in the minds of the jurors whose mental
models of Black people include this stereotype.” 132 Similarly, pros–
ecutors can evoke this stereotype through verbs commonly associated
with animals, such as “hunt” or “pounce.”133 Other words associated
with animals can have a similar effect, such as “prey,” or “jungle.”134
Additionally, prosecutors can associate defendants with people
commonly associated with Black violence, for example invoking O.J.
Simpson “since Simpson has become an avatar of the [b]rute caricature

izing research showing a connection between information about race of
offenders and support for punitive measures in the criminal justice system).
127. Alford, supra note 39, at 335 (footnote omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 336.
130. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“[A] stereotype, which lies latent in the mind of its
adherent, does not have a force of its own. The appropriate stimulus is
often required to elicit the stereotype . . . .”).
131. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Prasad, supra note 49, at 3101 (“[J]urors’
implicit biases must be triggered before they can adversely affect a defendant’s
trial.”).
132. Alford, supra note 39, at 349 (footnote omitted).
133. Heller, supra note 19, at 880.
134. Id.
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in the White community.”135 References to neighborhoods or physical
characteristics like hairstyles can also evoke stereotypes. 136 Finally,
stereotypes can even be activated through what sounds like a disavowal,
such as when a prosecutor says “[r]ace has nothing . . . to do with this
case” before making an argument that appeals to racial stereotypes.137
4.

Framing and Recency Bias

Racist prosecutorial rhetoric can affect the jury regardless of when
it happens at trial; however, the “order and context in which people
encounter new information” can play a crucial role in the way that
information is understood and remembered.138
Much of the scholarship on racist prosecutorial rhetoric focuses on
closing arguments, also called summations. 139 That scholarship
emphasizes the important role that closing arguments play, particularly
given the greater narrative freedom in these arguments. 140 Scholars
often note the importance of the prosecutor getting the last word141 and
that courts impose relatively few constraints on closing arguments.142
This focus on closing arguments is supported by psychological research
on “recency effect,” which involves a focus on the most recent
information presented.143 “Recency effects arise when a fact-finder is
135. Alford, supra note 39, at 352.
136. Id. at 353.
137. See, e.g., id. at 356 (quoting Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 99 (3d Cir.
2001)). Alford notes that reviewing courts generally take these arguments at
face value, as being a disavowal of the role of race in decision-making, rather
than recognizing the use of a rhetorical device to activate racial biases; see
also id. at 357–59; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases,
67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739, 1752 (1993) (quoting State v. Snowden, 675 P.2d
289, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)) (describing a case where the prosecutor said
“I don’t mean to be racial about this . . . do you think you’re going to leave
a [B]lack guy out there in a car, or a big car while a robbery is going on?”).
138. Mark Spottswood, Ordering Proof: Beyond Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Trial Structures, 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 291, 293 (2015).
139. See generally Bowman, supra note 16, at 342–45 (synthesizing various
sources on prosecutorial closing arguments).
140. See, e.g., Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in
Closing Argument: An Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 Ohio
N.U. L. Rev. 67, 73–74 (2001) (illustrating that closing arguments are
cabined only by a prohibition on appealing to the “passion or prejudice”
of the jury).
141. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?,
27 Am. J. Crim. L. 139, 146–56 (2000) (discussing various studies about the
importance of closing argument in juror decision-making).
142. Alford, supra note 39, at 329.
143. See Spottswood, supra note 138, at 294.
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presented with voluminous, challenging evidence, and they must make
an immediate decision following trial.”144 This research suggests that
comments in closing arguments are likely to have outsized significance
compared to comments in the middle of the trial. And rebuttal closing
arguments may be particularly problematic, given that defense counsel
has no opportunity to respond.145
In addition to the recency effect, the research on priming
demonstrates the importance of comments made early in the trial, such
as during opening statements or voir dire. In some contexts, the
research demonstrates “primacy effect,” which is the tendency for the
first piece of information to shape understanding and memory of
subsequent information.146 “Once people have an impression or belief,
they are inclined to pay less attention to subsequent information,
particularly information that contradicts the impression.”147 Advocates
can shape this impression through framing, which is “a process whereby
communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point
of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted
by others in a particular manner.”148 Advocates use framing techniques
when articulating trial themes at the beginning of a case and shape
their case presentation and arguments around those themes. Framing
and priming are closely related, as they both relate to making “certain
information more salient or accessible.”149
Context affects whether primacy or recency is more important to
particular decisions,150 but the details of the conflicting studies are not
crucial here. Instead, the key idea is that racist prosecutorial rhetoric
in voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments all can have a
significant effect on how jurors understand and evaluate criminal cases,
and these effects are generally subconscious rather than conscious.

144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in
Closing Arguments, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 887, 909 (2018) (discussing the need
for trial courts to step in when improper arguments are made in rebuttal
closing).
146. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the
Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 Or. L. Rev. 305,
346 (2010).
147. Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 118.
148. Hyatt Browning Shirkey, Last Attorney to the Jury Box Is A Rotten Egg:
Overcoming Psychological Hurdles in the Order of Presentation at Trial, 8
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 585 (2011).
149. Berger & Stanchi, supra note 100, at 129.
150. Stanchi, supra note 146, at 347.
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5.

Neuroscience and Neurorhetoric

Neuroscience and the emerging discipline of neurorhetoric help
provide a biological explanation for the power of stereotypes and coded
language. Neuroscience is the study of the organization and functions
of the brain.151 Neuroscience studies help confirm the results of social
psychological studies of race152 and explain how brain functions lead to
the results observed in psychological studies.153 While some have argued
that reliance on neuroscience creates a risk of biologizing racism, and
thereby removing it from its historical and social contexts,154 others
emphasize the importance of examining the complexity of the various
factors that influence racism. 155 “[N]euroscience explains that when
rhetoric influences us, it does so in an embodied way, triggering
electrochemical reactions that traverse our neural pathways, beyond
the purview of our conscious thought.”156 Neurorhetoric thus builds on
neuroscience to explain how racist rhetoric physically effects the human
brain.157
Scholarship on racism and neuroscience often emphasizes the role
of the amygdala, a region of the brain associated with fear and the
fight-or-flight reaction.158 Neuroscientific studies on racial biases show
activation of the subject’s amygdala when exposed to racialized stimuli,
perhaps because the racialized stimuli leads the person to perceive a
threat. 159 Out-group association can also cause activation of the
amygdala: “Where a person’s identity is of an out-group to our own
151. Anna Spain Bradley, The Disruptive Neuroscience of Judicial Choice, 9 U.C.
Irvine L. Rev. 1, 20 (2018).
152. Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, On the Permanence of Racial
Injustice and the Possibility of Deracialization, 69 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev.
299, 325 (2018).
153. Bradley, supra note 151, at 18.
154. Jonathan Kahn, Pills for Prejudice: Implicit Bias and Technical Fix for
Racism, 43 Am. J.L. & Med. 263, 265, 271 (2017).
155. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 St.
Louis U. L.J. 1139, 1147 (2010) (suggesting that to understand racialization,
one needs multiple levels of analysis from different perspectives).
156. Jewel, supra note 18, at 663.
157. Id. “Whereas cognitive rhetoric might be conceived as the study of how
persuasion works in the mind, neurorhetoric looks at how persuasion works
in a biological sense, in the brain.” Id. at 669 (emphasis omitted).
158. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 151, at 28 (discussing the high importance
of amygdala among neuroscience researchers).
159. See Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical
Decision-Making in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47
Gonz. L. Rev. 319, 328 (2011); Ramirez & Williams, supra note 152, at
325–26.
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and one that has historically or culturally been associated with negative
traits, we process such perceptions and biases in our amygdala, which
is where we also process fear.”160 Activation of the amygdala also affects
memory, causing heightened attention to some details at the expense
of other details.161
However, the amygdala is not the only part of the brain relevant
to understanding racism. Decision-making involves multiple regions of
the brain, sometimes operating sequentially and sometimes operating
simultaneously.162 These “various regions of our brain, and [the] neural
circuitry that connects them, engage in cross-talk when we decide, make
a choice, or change our mind.”163 Activity in one part of the brain can
thus affect another part, such as when emotional rhetoric leads to the
release of chemical reactions that dampen the prefrontal cortex that
controls higher-order thinking.164
This research also helps explain the formation and power of
stereotypes. For example, “neuroscience demonstrates that the
amygdala activity requires social conditioning from a young
age . . . [which] suggests that racial responses are learned respon–
ses.” 165 Relatedly, neuroscience helps explain the development of
racially coded associations, as our “[c]ulture can produce unified
categories that function as metaphorical ‘code’ for more implicit con–
cepts.”166 References to concepts trigger the majoritarian cultural values
associated with those concepts. 167 Repetition, a common rhetorical
technique, entrenches these neural pathways, making it smoother and
faster “for a conclusory message to reach an individual’s consciousness”
and creating more certainty in the associated belief.168 Thus, repeated
cultural references to coded categories “encourage rapid unconscious
160. Bradley, supra note 42, at 31.
161. Halliburton, supra note 159, at 325.
162. Bradley, supra note 151, at 23. Bradley notes that psychologist Daniel
Kahneman popularized these concepts through his explanation of System 1
thought as quick and automatic, with System 2 thought being slower and
more complex. Id.
163. Id. at 26–27.
164. Jewel, supra note 18, at 673. For a more detailed discussion of the role of
emotion in decision-making, see Bradley, supra note 151, at 29–36. Bradley
notes that emotion related to what is being decided can be helpful, while
unrelated emotion can be a distraction, id. at 34, and that emotion can both
help and hinder “normatively correct responses,” id. at 36 (quotation
omitted).
165. Ramirez & Williams, supra note 152, at 326–27 (footnote omitted).
166. Jewel, supra note 18, at 667.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 664.
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thinking that has the effect of hardwiring stereotypes into the pathways
of the brain.”169
Professor Lucille Jewel’s article on neurorhetoric applies these
concepts to explain the effectiveness of the Nazi rhetoric dehumanizing
Jewish people. 170 She noted that Nazi propaganda activated and
deepened entrenched neural pathways, reinforcing majoritarian cultural
values and “a sense of commonality in the face of threat.”171 At the
same time, the emotional component of the propaganda hindered
activation of higher-order thinking and instead anesthetized Germans
to the realities of human suffering.172
She also explains how the “welfare queen” stereotype popularized
in the United States in the 1980s was coded language that unconsciously
activated a variety of negative stereotypes.173 The welfare queen image
likely “triggered concomitant firings in various neural pathways related
to concepts as disparate as women, good and bad mothers, the implicit
bias against African Americans, visualized luxury automobiles, and
moral verdicts.”174 As a result of the repeated use of the welfare queen
metaphor, Americans’ view of welfare shifted from a helpful safety net
protecting vulnerable children into a “racialized locus of fraud and
immorality.” 175 These two examples help demonstrate the powerful
impact of racially coded language on perception and decision-making.176
6.

Group Decision-Making Can Help But Does Not
Cure Individual Biases

Some may expect that group decision-making, like that involved in
jury deliberations, would cure at least some types of individual biases.
With respect to memory errors, however, Levinson concluded that jury
deliberations likely preserve rather than challenge individual memory
errors.177 Studies on jury deliberations show that jurors try to agree on
a common narrative through a combination of “rational persuasion,
sheer social pressure, and the psychological mechanism by which
169. Id.
170. Id. at 675–76.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 677–78.
174. Id. at 678.
175. Id.
176. Although Jewel’s analysis may seem bleak, she concludes her article by
offering more hopeful prescriptions about how these toxic neural pathways
can be overcome, as discussed infra at notes 356, 360, and accompanying
text.
177. Levinson, supra note 94, at 387–88.
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individual perceptions undergo change when exposed to group
discussion.”178 During this process, the most vocal jurors do not always
have the most accurate memories, and the likelihood of jurors changing
their verdict depends more on their confidence in their memories rather
than the accuracy of those memories.179 Therefore, the evidence that
jury deliberation improves memories is at best weak.180 Furthermore,
vocal jurors can use improper closing arguments as “ammunition” in
the jury room to help persuade other jurors,181 so jury deliberations can
amplify rather than minimize the effect of individual biases.
Research does suggest, however, that diversity in jury composition
can affect jury deliberations in positive ways.182 One study suggests that
lawyers are less likely to appeal to stereotypes when arguing to a diverse
jury. 183 But even if jury diversity doesn’t change attorney behavior,
several studies show that increased jury diversity improves decisionmaking.184
One study found that compared “with all-White juries, the diverse
juries discussed the case longer, considered more of the evidence, and
were more accurate in their discussion of that evidence.” 185 That study
also indicated that diverse juries were more likely to discuss the
potential impact of the defendant’s race on the case, with both Black
and white participants engaging in that conversation:186
Perhaps the most important insight from the study was that the
more intense deliberation was not the result of African American
jurors contributing different perspectives, but it was the result of
White jurors who acted differently, more conscious, in the

178. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 327 (2013)
(quoting Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 489
(1966)).
179. Levinson, supra note 94, at 389 (discussing Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M.
Keenan, Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ Memories?, 16
Applied Cognitive Psych. 589, 600 (2002)).
180. Id.
181. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 892.
182. Hunt, supra note 18, at 274 (“[B]iases in jury decision making often occur
in response to the interaction of races among trial parties, not the race of a
single party.”). Much scholarly work is being done on the Batson issue. See,
e.g., sources cited supra note 33. However, the Batson issue is generally
beyond the scope of this article.
183. Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 236.
184. Id. (summarizing studies).
185. Hunt, supra note 18, at 279.
186. Id.
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presence of other diverse jurors, presumably because they did not
want to appear biased.187

That research connects to the Aversive Racism Theory mentioned
above, which indicates that jurors do a better job of guarding against
the influence of prejudice when they see race as salient.188 The presence
of jurors of color may implicitly make race salient for white jurors,
“reminding them of their egalitarianism and thereby decreasing their
biases.”189 This research shows that diverse juries are one tool that can
help minimize the impact of biases; other tools are discussed in more
detail below in Part III(C).

II. Courts’ Current Approaches Are Ineffective at
Dealing with Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial
Current law fails to prevent racist prosecutorial rhetoric or ade–
quately deal with it when it occurs. Section A shows that prosecutors
are using racist prosecutorial rhetoric. Section B shows that courts deny
that even explicitly racist language has racialized meaning, while
Section C describes the procedural devices that appellate courts use to
uphold convictions.
A.

Prosecutors Use Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric

The sections above introduced the backdrop of how race can affect
criminal trials generally and how racist rhetoric can exacerbate these
underlying issues of racialized decision-making. This section illustrates
how recent cases demonstrate that prosecutors use these racist themes
and images in seeking convictions.190 The cases discussed below show a
wide variety of ways that prosecutors’ racist rhetoric invoke stereotypes
or otherwise prime the jury to decide based on racial prejudices.
While most of the cases below contain more subtle references, some
relatively recent cases involve explicitly racist language and argu–

187. Selmi, supra note 26, at 229.
188. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
189. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1701; see also Liana Peter-Hagene, Jurors’
Cognitive Depletion and Performance During Jury Deliberation as a Function
of Jury Diversity and Defendant Race, 43 L. & Hum. Behav. 232, 234 (2019)
(“Specifically, people might become [cognitively] depleted when they engage
in interracial interactions, but these interactions might also provide the very
impetus needed for people to become aware of, and motivated to avoid, racial
bias.”).
190. This section focuses on the prosecutor’s arguments in cases within the last
twenty-five years, without regard to what the reviewing courts thought of
them, a topic discussed in Sections B and C below.
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ments.191 For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1996 analyzed
a case in which the prosecutor used the n-word repeatedly in discussing
the motive for the crime.192 The Alabama Supreme Court concluded
that the motive argument would have been fine without the “emotion–
ally charged racial slur.”193 A more recent Seventh Circuit case upheld
a defendant’s conviction for shooting three police officers when the
prosecutor asked several witnesses about whether defendant’s beliefs
“as a [B]lack Muslim” provided a motive to shoot the officers that would
overcome his insanity defense.194
More commonly, appellate cases involve animal imagery. 195 For
example, prosecutors in California often compare criminal defendants
to a “Bengal Tiger,” an analogy built on the idea that Bengal tigers
seem docile in captivity but indiscriminately kill in the wild. 196 “In
California, the use of this story is not limited to one or two counties, or
one or two prosecutors. It has been used all over the state.” 197
Additionally, a 2016 case from the Fourth Circuit discussed a death
penalty sentencing hearing in which the prosecutor argued that giving
the defendant a life sentence rather than the death penalty would allow
for him to “come back out. Meeting him again will be like meeting King

191. For a summary of older cases on this topic, see S. Johnson, supra note 137,
at 1754 & nn.57–59. Of course, reasonable people can disagree on where to
draw the line between “blatant” racist arguments and more subtle ones. Id.
at 1760–61.
192. Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 504–05 (Ala. 1996). The prosecutor also used
a variant of the n-word, “n*****itious,” to refer to hatred of Black people.
The prosecutor and the Alabama Supreme Court opinion spelled both words
out rather than using the asterisks. While the prosecutor used these words
in prosecuting what appears to be a hate crime against a person of color by
a white person, rather than using it against a Black defendant, prosecutors’
use of this language raise a variety of concerns. See infra Section III(B) for
more on why prosecutors should be held to a higher standard than defense
counsel.
193. Id. at 505. Jeff Sessions was the Alabama Attorney General at the time
Alabama defended this conviction. Id. at 498.
194. Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 2000). The court concluded
that these were proper questions even though every witness asked denied
this possible motive and “characterized black Muslims as peaceful and lawabiding citizens.” Id. at 831.
195. For examples of older cases using animal imagery see Johnson, supra note
137, at 1753–54.
196. Heller, supra note 19, at 870–71.
197. Id. at 877, 883 (quoting People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 143 (1991)) (noting
that it has been used since the mid-1990s in capital cases in at least six counties
and that the California Supreme Court has “unequivocally” upheld the
practice, concluding that it “does not [necessarily] invoke racial overtones”).
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Kong on a bad day.”198 The prosecutor also labeled the defendant as a
“monster,” a “big old tiger,” and “the beast of burden.”199 Prosecutors
use a variety of other animal images as well, such as calling a group of
defendants “a pack of wolves” or individual defendants “a punk thug
dog” or “a snake [who] slithers on his underbelly.”200
Prosecutors also find a variety of other ways to invoke racialized
stereotypes. For example, an Idaho case in 2014 involved a prosecutor
singing a few lines of “the Dixie song[,] Right? Oh, I wish I was in the
land of cotton. Good times not forgotten.”201 Another case involved
repeated references to “the white lady” and comments about the Black
defendant’s vulgar sexual comments to her, even though the case
involved justifiable homicide in a later altercation far removed from the
“white lady.”202 Another prosecutor repeatedly said “po-leese” instead
of “police” to call attention to the defendant’s race in connection with
an argument about an alleged Black anti-snitching code and stated that
“black folk don’t testify against black folk.”203 In another case, the pros–
ecutor twice referred to defendants as “bad people.”204 After the trial
court overruled an objection, the prosecutor escalated the argument:
“There are bad people in the world, ladies and gentlemen. We are lucky
where we live not to come into contact with as many as there may be
in other parts of the country. But there are still some around here.”205
Prosecutors sometimes invoke these stereotypes while simultaneously
denying that they are doing so, such as by saying: “Well, we know what
that’s a code word for. He’s a big, strong, [B]lack man, but he’s a rough
character. Members of the [j]ury, this is not about race.”206
198. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2016).
199. Id.
200. Heller, supra note 19, at 878–80 nn.53–70 and accompanying text (including
these and other animal images).
201. State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
202. Wallace v. State, 768 So.2d 1247, 1249–50 (Fla. 2000). Although, the actions
toward the white woman led to the altercation, the court indicated that
race should not be considered in making the determination of culpability at
the time of the shooting.
203. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 553–54, 557 (Wash. 2011).
204. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996).
205. Id.
206. State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2005) (underscoring that the
prosecutor’s argument in that case was particularly appalling because he
was suggesting that defense counsel was making a racial argument when
that was not the case); see also State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 620 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2002) (prosecutor stated “[r]ace has nothing to do with this case.
In fact, as [the victim] said, her son is half black; her boyfriend was black.”);
Cole v. State, 399 P.3d 618, 620 (Wyo. 2017) (prosecutor argued in rebuttal
closing that “an African-American man in Wyoming is still not allowed to
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Sexual assault cases provide a particularly common setting for
racist rhetoric, especially language that suggests that the crime is worse
because of the race of the perpetrator.207 Prosecutors sometimes bring
in references to skin color in these cases, with weak pretexts as to why
skin color is relevant. 208 The prosecutor in one case made repeated
references to the victim being a local Hawaiian girl who began to be
afraid when “she sees that there are six African-American males in the
room.”209 Another prosecutor stated that it is “every mother’s night–
mare” to find “some black, military guy on top of your daughter.”210 By
calling attention to race in these cases, the prosecutors subtly—or not
so subtly—invoked the emotion surrounding the stereotype of Black
men being sexually predatory towards white women.211
B.

Appellate Courts Often Refuse to Recognize Improper Language

Although prosecutors use racist prosecutorial rhetoric, appellate
courts often fail to recognize much of that rhetoric as racist, or even
more generically improper.212 In doing so, courts’ reasoning is strained
steal a car and take the police on a high-speed chase. It doesn’t matter what
race he is. A white person is not allowed to do that either.”). In repeating
the references to race, the prosecutor called attention to race while formally
arguing that it was irrelevant. See Alford, supra note 39, at 357–59
(regarding why that approach invokes stereotypes).
207. For example, the case in which the prosecutor sang the lines of the “Dixie
song” referring to cotton involved sexual assault of a minor. State v. Kirk,
339 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). “We agree that the racial
reference here was indirect and perhaps innocently made.” Id. at 1217.
However, the court emphasized that the effect on the jury was more
important than prosecutorial intent. Id.
208. People v. Robinson, 454 P.3d 229, 231 (Colo. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL
5882233 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (No. 19-1218) (prosecutor made graphic com–
ments about rape victim’s pasty white skin color and seeing a black penis).
209. State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 610 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
omitted). The victim’s fear might have come from being outnumbered, but
the race of the men outnumbering her should not have sparked that fear,
as the prosecutor suggested. See id.
210. State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Haw. 1999).
211. For a discussion of stereotypes related to sexuality, see Cornel West,
Race Matters 86–87 (1993).
212. Of course, appellate courts do sometimes appropriately recognize and reject
racist prosecutorial rhetoric. See, e.g., Kirk, 339 P.3d at 1216 (“‘Dixie’ was
an anthem of the Confederacy, an ode to the Old South, which references
with praise a time and place of the most pernicious racism. The prosecutor’s
mention of the title, ‘Dixie,’ as well as the specific lyrics recited by the
prosecutor, referring to ‘the land of cotton,’ expressly evoke that setting with
all its racial overtones.”). In United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064
(8th Cir. 2000), the court noted that the prosecutor repeatedly argued that
the defendant was lying because he “is here under fraudulent and illegal

71

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

in a variety of ways, from affirmatively endorsing arguments as proper
to minimizing their impropriety.
Courts sometimes affirmatively justify even explicitly racist
rhetoric. For example, the California Supreme Court found “no impro–
priety in the argument” based on the Bengal tiger analogy described
above.213 The prosecutor in one California case described going to the
San Diego Zoo and seeing “a Bengal tiger in captivity, behind bars, and
is being fed so much meat every day” and “looking like [a] kitten[].”214
The prosecutor then contrasted the Bengal tiger in captivity with one
“in its natural habitat” behind a palm frond in India or Pakistan, then
immediately shifted to talking about the defendant: “If you were there
that night, you wouldn’t see the defendant in his suit, the way you have
seen him in this trial. You would see him with a butcher knife, out to
get money. You would be seeing him in a very natural habitat.”215 The
California Supreme Court justified this argument in two different ways.
First, the court concluded that the “prosecutor was attempting to focus
the jury’s attention on the vicious nature of the crime” and was entitled
to argue “that modest behavior in the courtroom was not inconsistent
with violent conduct under other less structured and controlled
circumstances.” 216 The court also rejected the defendant’s argument
that the Bengal tiger analogy was racist: “Likening a vicious murderer
to a wild animal does not invoke racial overtones. Indeed, the circum–
stances of the murder might have justified even more opprobrious
epithets.” 217 That case is not an outlier; California courts use that
reasoning repeatedly, including a nearly identical version in a more
recent California Supreme Court opinion.218

circumstances, and as such, he is basically from day to day living a lie” which
made “lying and deceiving to Mr. Cruz-Padilla not something that is hard
to do or out of the ordinary.” Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d at 1068. The court
concluded that the prosecutor crossed the line by emphasizing emotion
rather than evidence and that the “government’s repeated references to
Cruz-Padilla’s [immigration] status reinforced to the jury his foreign origin
and contributed nothing of a legitimate evidentiary value.” Id. at 1069.
213. People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 142 (Cal. 1991); see also Heller, supra note
19, at 883.
214. Duncan, 810 P.2d at 142.
215. Id. The prosecutor’s next sentence was about the overwhelming evidence
of the defendant’s guilt. Id.
216. Id. at 142–43.
217. Id. at 143.
218. People v. Brady, 236 P.3d 312, 342 (2010) (adding “necessarily” to the idea
that wild animal comparisons are not racial and concluding that prosecutors
are entitled to argue that docile behavior in the courtroom is not inconsistent
with murdering someone). The courts’ reasoning in these cases fails to
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Similarly, state courts in South Carolina concluded that comparing
a defendant to King Kong was an appropriate reference to the
defendant’s size and strength. 219 The court similarly concluded that
calling the defendant, Bennett, a “caveman” was “merely descriptive”
of testimony that Bennett had pulled someone by the hair twice.220 The
court acknowledged that the King Kong reference “could have racial
connotations” but still “was not an appeal to the passions or prejudices
of the jury.” 221 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Bennett’s habeas
proceeding explained the flaws in this reasoning, noting that throughout
history, Black people “have been appallingly disparaged as primates or
members of a subhuman species in some lesser state of evolution.”222
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor thus encouraged the
jury to view Bennett as less human because of his race.223 The Fourth
Circuit’s analysis reflects the social science research described above,
but it came in an opinion issued sixteen years after the hearing in which
the prosecutor made these arguments.224 In another case, the Supreme
Court of Georgia, a federal district court, and the Eleventh Circuit all
failed to acknowledge the racial significance of the prosecutor calling
the defendant “a mad dog” even though that “characterization
implicated all three of the key definitions of the brute [stereotype]: a
mad dog is an animal that is also brutally violent, incapable of thought,
and acts completely on impulse.”225
account for the longstanding stereotype associating Black people with
animals. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
219. State v. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288 (S.C. 2006). The Fourth Circuit, in
upholding the granting of Bennett’s habeas petition, correctly noted that
“[t]he prosecutor easily could have highlighted Bennett’s physical attributes
in a race-neutral manner.” Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir.
2016) (including pointing out that the same prosecutor had done so in an
earlier hearing and giving examples of how the prosecutor could have done
so again).
220. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d at 289.
221. Id. at 288.
222. Stirling, 842 F.3d at 324–25.
223. Id. at 324. That court also noted the reference’s cross-racial implications, as
King Kong swings “the frail, white, blonde Fay Wray at the top of the
Empire State Building.” The court also quoted a journal article calling the
movie “a racist cautionary tale about interracial romance.” Id. at 325
(quoting the appellee’s brief, which quoted Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L.
Eberhardt, Matthew Christian Jackson & Melissa J. Williams, Not Yet
Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary
Consequences, 94 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 292, 293 (2008)).
224. Id. at 319, 321.
225. Alford, supra note 39, at 350 (describing Johnson v. Zandt, 295 S.E.2d 63,
69 (Ga. 1982)).
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Additionally, courts fail to acknowledge explicitly racial language
by suggesting that jurors may attribute non-racial meanings to the
words used. For example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “it is not
even certain . . . that the reference to the witness’s ‘shucking and
jiving’ was racial in character” because although the “phrase is Negro
dialect . . . numerous other words and phrases of that dialect . . .
have become absorbed into standard English and are now applied to
members of all racial and ethnic groups.”226 That court also concluded
that calling the defendant “super-fly” was unmistakably racial because
it was a reference to a movie series, but reasoned that because those
movies were marketed to Black audiences, it was unclear whether the
white jury would have understood the reference.227
Courts sometimes deflect the racist overtones of prosecutorial
rhetoric by focusing on the prosecutor’s intent. The Supreme Court,
outside the context of racial arguments, said that courts “should not
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its
most damaging meaning.”228 The Seventh Circuit includes this idea in
its formulation of the rule on racial arguments: “a racial remark is
improper if it is ‘intentionally injected into volatile proceedings where
the prosecutor had targeted the defendant’s ethnic origin for emphasis
in an attempt to appeal to the jury’s prejudices.’”229 That court applied
this rule to justify questions to several witnesses about the defendant’s
“membership in the [B]lack Muslim faith” because these questions
“were only meant to show” motive and were “clearly intended to rebut”
the defendant’s proffered insanity defense.230 Similarly, an author ex–
tensively discusses an Oklahoma capital case in which the court justified
the prosecutor’s introduction of an image of a black ape and, while
showing the image to the jury, said “that’s [the defendant] in a
nutshell.”231 The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and
the court of appeals explicitly concluded that the prosecutor did not
226. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1995).
227. Id.
228. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974) (cautioning the courts
against assuming that the jury will “draw [the most damaging] meaning
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations”).
229. See, e.g., Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1989)).
230. Id. at 830–31. The concurrence noted the problem with that reasoning: “to
ascribe to a defendant a motive to kill simply because he is a Black Muslim
and because other African-Americans, or other Muslims, have expressed
distrust (or worse) of different races and religions, is to engage in wholly
inappropriate stereotyping.” Id. at 832 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
231. Alford, supra note 39, at 342 (discussing Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 97
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994)) (emphasis omitted).
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intend the statement to be interpreted as arguing that the defendant
was an ape. 232 As explained above, however, whether a statement
activates a stereotype has nothing to do with whether the person
making the statement intended for it to do so. Courts should be focusing
on the potential impact of the statement on the jury, not on the
prosecutor’s intent.233
Relatedly, courts sometimes avoid confronting the racist dimension
of prosecutorial rhetoric by using more generic labels like “inflam–
matory” or “name-calling.”234 For example, in the Oklahoma capital
case, only one court out of many levels of review even came close to
acknowledging the racist dimension of the prosecutor’s use of the “black
ape” image with the statement that the image was the defendant in a
nutshell. 235 The Tenth Circuit labeled the image and language
“improper name calling” without acknowledging the inherent racism;
the court used that weaker label in an unpublished opinion denying the
defendant’s habeas petition. 236 In another case, the United States
Supreme Court failed to explicitly note the racial connotations of the
prosecution’s reference to the defendant as an animal and statement
that the defendant “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on
him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash.”237
Finally, courts fail to clarify the appropriate line between proper
and improper rhetoric by blurring the analytically distinct issues of
whether the language was improper and whether the defendant was

232. Id. Prosecutors in other cases discussed in the prior subsection argued that
they did not intend their comments to be racist, although the courts rejected
those arguments. See, e.g., State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 621 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2002) (prosecutor argued that he didn’t intend to be racist and that
he referred to defendants as Afro-American because he didn’t want to use
the victim’s words of “black dude”).
233. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3118 (noting that prosecutorial intent can
sometimes be difficult to discern, and that if motives do matter, courts
should consider more than explicit bias because “[t]he fact that some courts
find subtle racial arguments plausible suggests that the jurors might find
them persuasive”).
234. Scholars often use the “inflammatory” or “name-calling” labels for racist
prosecutorial rhetoric. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 39, at 329–30, 364. Those
categories, however, also include non-racial arguments, such as appeal to
patriotism or class. See, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Recognizing Errors in Closing Argument, 26 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 535,
561–62 (2003).
235. Alford, supra note 39, at 342–43 (discussing Allen, 871 P.2d at 97).
236. Id. at 342. Ms. Allen was ultimately executed. Id. at 340.
237. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 n.12 (1986).
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prejudiced by the prosecutor’s rhetoric.238 For example, in a 2020 North
Carolina case involving the prosecution of a white defendant for killing
a young Black man, the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argued that race
had been an undercurrent of the whole case and a focus of defense
counsel’s closing. 239 After the defense’s objection was overruled, the
prosecutor said: “Let’s talk about the elephant in the room. If they
want to go there, consider it.”240 The prosecutor then rhetorically asked
if the victim and others with him “were a bunch of young, white males
walking around wearing N.C. State hats, is he laying dead bleeding in
that yard?”241 The North Carolina Supreme Court assumed without
deciding that these remarks were improper, focusing instead on whether
the argument was prejudicial; the court upheld the conviction because
there was no reasonable probability that the defendant would have been
acquitted if the trial court had sustained the objection.242 The concur–
rence wrote separately to explain that the prosecutor’s argument was
proper because it was not based on racial animosity and because the
case had involved a risk that jurors could be swayed by race, starting
from jury selection onward. 243 The concurrence was right in this
analysis, but the majority’s approach in assuming that the comments
were improper may make future prosecutors afraid to address the racial
motive for a hate crime.244
C.

Appellate Procedural Doctrines Prevent Meaningful Remedies

Even when courts label racist prosecutorial rhetoric as improper,
they often fail to provide any meaningful remedy because of the appel–
late doctrines of harmless error and plain error.245 The combined effect

238. The courts often do so when analyzing plain error in the absence of an
objection. See infra Section II(C). But they sometimes do so even when the
defendant objects. See State v. Copley, 839 S.E.2d 726, 728 (N.C. 2020).
239. Copley, 839 S.E.2d at 728.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 731.
243. Id. at 732.
244. For a discussion of the specific challenges of prosecuting white defendants
for committing crimes against people of color, see infra note 307.
245. See, e.g., V.A. Richelle, Racism as a Strategic Tool at Trial: Appealing RaceBased Prosecutorial Misconduct, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2357, 2358 (1993)
(“However, procedural and substantive doctrines such as harmless-error
analysis and limited standards of review may tie the hands of appellate
courts. The courts’ limited ability to review actions of the trial court and the
small number of remedies available to them may preclude the reversal of
verdicts colored by racial prejudice.”).
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of these doctrines means that “prosecutors know they are likely to get
away with this form of misbehavior.”246
The harmless-error doctrine allows an appellate court to uphold a
conviction even after finding that the prosecutor’s conduct was
improper when the appellate court concludes that the case against the
defendant was so strong that the improper conduct likely did not
change the outcome.247 Several scholars have critiqued courts’ harmless
error analysis as overestimating the strength of the government’s case
or relying too much on simply counting the number of improper
references.248 This approach is inconsistent with the research described
above about how racial stereotyping can taint both memories and
evaluation of evidence of guilt.249
Scholars have also noted the perverse incentives created by
harmless error analysis, which encourages prosecutors to “weigh the
commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal
or ethical standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an
increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore
the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant’s
guilt.”250 Yet when cases are close, prosecutors still have an incentive to

246. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893, 922.
247. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 16, at 315. In some circumstances, defense
counsel must prove that the error affected the outcome, while in other
circumstances, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error was harmless. See, e.g., Richelle, supra note 245, at 2369–70. Some
have argued that neither of those standards is adequate, and instead that
courts should treat race-based prosecutorial misconduct as a structural error
that requires immediate reversal without consideration of whether the
misconduct was harmless. See, e.g., id. at 2368.
248. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 15, at 327 (noting that courts often count the
references without engaging in deeper analysis of their effect); Demetria D.
Frank, The Proof is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act
Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 Harv. J. Racial & Ethnic
Just. 1, 24–25 nn.139, 142 (2016) (noting that courts often rely on the
weight of the evidence against the defendant); Bowman, supra note 16, at
347–52 (discussing several problems with courts’ harmless error analysis in
cases of improper prosecutorial rhetoric without focusing specifically on
racist prosecutorial rhetoric—but much of the same logic applies in this
specific context).
249. See supra Part I(B). It also arguably shifts the burden of fairness to the
defendant. Earle, supra note 34, at 1229.
250. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 425
(1992); see also Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of
the American Prosecutor 127 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (“[The harmless
error rule] permits, perhaps even unintentionally encourages, prosecutors to
engage in misconduct during trial with the assurance that so long as the
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear, the conviction will be affirmed.”).
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use improper rhetoric to tip the scales. 251 Thus, the harmless-error
doctrine fails to provide any disincentive to avoid racist prosecutorial
rhetoric.252
When appellate courts label conduct as improper but refuse to
impose any meaningful remedy, the appellate courts’ warnings about
impropriety are easily seen as empty threats.253 For example, one author
discusses a Florida case in which defense counsel on appeal noted that
seven previous cases warned prosecutors that the same argument was
prosecutorial misconduct; in the eighth case, the appellate court merely
declared that appellate courts would be forced to start ordering
reversals if this line of improper argument continued in future cases.254
He also discussed a similar California case in which the appellate court
threatened that future reversals might be necessary but still affirmed a
conviction even though the court found it “disheartening” that the
prosecutor “took pride in” previous admonitions about improper
conduct. 255 These empty threats of future reversals without present
consequences functionally tell prosecutors that they can continue doing
what they have been doing. When courts routinely hold that conduct
is improper but harmless, that “creates a culture in which
. . . defendants are virtually guaranteed to have their constitutional
rights violated.”256
The situation is even worse when defense counsel fails to object and
appellate courts invoke the plain-error doctrine. Although appellate
courts generally refuse to review issues that were not presented to the
251. Alford, supra note 39, at 334 (analogizing closing arguments to a basketball
game in the final minute; the closer the score, the more the prosecution has
an incentive to use racist prosecutorial rhetoric).
252. See Bowman, supra note 16, at 316–17 (arguing that beyond the incentives
created, courts’ current approaches to these issues may exacerbate prosecutors’
own cognitive biases).
253. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893–94.
254. Id. at 893 (discussing Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 521–22 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984)).
255. Id. at 894 (discussing People v. Congious, No. B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 1987)). Although these cases involved other types of prosecutorial
misconduct in argument, rather than racist prosecutorial rhetoric, the same
“empty threat” dynamic is at play when courts refuse to reverse.
256. State v. Jackson, No. 97681-3, 2020 WL 4006802, at *7 (Wash. July 16,
2020). The state had conceded at oral argument that trial courts were
refusing to hold individualized hearings required by precedent, which led
to the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning quoted above about a
system in which defendants were virtually guaranteed to have their rights
violated. Id. Although Jackson involved mandatory shackling rather than
racist prosecutorial rhetoric, the court’s reasoning applies in this context
as well, particularly if trial courts are overruling objections or otherwise
justifying racist prosecutorial rhetoric.
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trial court through formal objections, the plain-error doctrine allows for
that review when failure to do so would undermine the trial’s
fundamental fairness.257 Courts often use this doctrine to review claims
of racist prosecutorial rhetoric. 258 However, this standard is nearly
impossible to meet, as it often requires a defendant to prove both that
the remarks were so improper as to have denied him a fair trial and
that the result of the trial would have been different without the
remarks.259
The plain-error doctrine therefore inappropriately puts the burden
on defense counsel to object rather than on the prosecutor to avoid
racist rhetoric.260 Yet defense counsel may have valid reasons for not
objecting, such as being afraid that they, rather than the prosecutor,
may be seen as the one “playing the ‘race card.’”261 The phrase “playing
the race card” is pejorative, suggesting “a dirty trick” to “exploit our
sympathies to racial injustice in order to secure some political or
material advantage.” 262 Defense counsel therefore rightly fear jury
backlash if the trial court overrules the objection.263
Furthermore, if well-intentioned prosecutors may not recognize the
racist dimension of their rhetoric, defense counsel may be even less

257. Richelle, supra note 245, at 2359 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 16 (1985)).
258. Id. at 2359–60.
259. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 922 (citing United States v. Anderson, 303
F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Richelle, supra note 245, at 2361–
62 (discussing various standards and approaches that courts use in plain
error review).
260. See Montz, supra note 140, at 76, 78 (discussing the “plain error” doctrine
and how it significantly limits appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct
when defense counsel fails to object).
261. See, e.g., Prasad, supra note 49, at 3112. This concern by defense counsel is
bolstered by case law in which prosecutors attack defense counsel for playing
the race card. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2005)
(alleging that defense counsel was “just throwing mud on young black men”
and then arguing that references to gang membership involved “wild and, I
submit, racist speculation on the part of counsel here”); United States v.
Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (addressing argument by
Black prosecutor that defense’s theory that Defendant had been mis-identified
as the one to commit a robbery was based on defense counsel arguing that
“we all look alike” without ever addressing the substance of the misidentification risk in the case).
262. Christopher A. Bracey, The Color of Our Future: The Pitfalls and Possibilities
of the Race Card in American Culture, 5 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 93–94
(2009).
263. Alford, supra note 39, at 337.
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likely to pick up on the problem with that rhetoric.264 But “subtle”
references to stereotypes may be even more dangerous than explicit
racist appeals given that they may activate biases without jurors
recognizing what is happening and guarding against them.265 And even
when defense counsel recognize the problem, “the misconduct typically
happens too quickly to mount a thoughtful and effective response.”266
Additionally, the plain-error doctrine sometimes leads to a lack of
clarity about whether prosecutorial remarks are improper. 267 That
approach makes it harder for prosecutors’ offices to use appellate
opinions in training prosecutors about the boundaries between proper
and improper arguments. 268 Appellate courts’ opinions can serve a
pedagogic function, but only when they draw reasonably clear lines
between proper and improper conduct.269
While these doctrines do not always stand in the way of reversal,270
courts often affirm convictions even in the face of fairly egregious
misconduct. 271 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court recently
relied on the plain-error doctrine in upholding the sexual assault
conviction of a defendant whose trial involved the prosecutor making
264. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3112 (noting that even if the plain-error doctrine
makes sense for explicitly racist appeals, it prevents defense counsel and trial
courts from providing meaningful intervention for arguments based on implicit
biases).
265. Armour, supra note 68, at 767.
266. Cicchini, supra note 145, at 893.
267. See supra Part II(C).
268. See Bruce A. Green, Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct, 50 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 797, 808–09 (2019).
269. See id. at 808.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
reversible error because “[w]e believe that by twice calling the AfricanAmerican Defendants ‘bad people’ and by calling attention to the fact that
[they] were not locals, the prosecutor gave the jury an improper and convenient
hook on which to hang their verdict”). In an unusual case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed a conviction even though it concluded that “it would
be difficult for us not to conclude that the prosecutor’s comments were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475
(Minn. 2005). The court concluded that although there was strong evidence of
the defendant’s guilt, reversal was required when the prosecutor’s argument
and the trial court’s overruling of defense’s objection “may have led the jury
to conclude that defense counsel himself was racist—an implication wholly
unsupported by the record.” Id. at 474–75.
271. For example, in Darden v. Wainright, the prosecutor said that the defendant
was an animal and should not be out of a cell without a leash. The Court
concluded that the comments did not “so [infect] the trial with unfairness”
as to require reversal. 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
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explicit and repeated references to the race and skin tone of the
defendant and victim. 272 The court of appeals had reversed the
conviction, reasoning among other things that “errors involving racial
discrimination must be treated with added precaution” and that
“comments that appeal to racial prejudice fundamentally undermine
the principle of equal justice and therefore demand that an appellate
court set appropriate standards to deter such conduct.”273 The court
agreed that the comments were improper, rejecting several arguments
by the government justifying the prosecutor’s remarks.274 However, the
court ultimately affirmed the conviction based on the plain-error
doctrine, reasoning that “we cannot say that the error so undermined
the fundamental fairness of [the defendant’s] trial so as to cast serious
doubt on the reliability of his judgment of conviction.”275
In another case, the court relied on the plain-error doctrine in
upholding a conviction even when the prosecutor’s opening statement
contained sixteen references to “black males,” “larger black male[s],”
and “smaller black male[s].”276 The court’s reasoning seemed to blur the
question of whether the comments were improper and whether they
were prejudicial. 277 The court stated that it did “not condone the
gratuitous use of race, as the prosecutors did in this case,” but the court
also emphasized that the remarks “were descriptive, not pejorative.”278

272. People v. Robinson, 454 P.3d 229, 231 (Colo. 2019) (“You’re going to hear
that [A.M.] is white. And she’s actually pretty pasty. She’s pasty white. And
you obviously have seen Mr. Robinson is dark. He is an African American of
dark complexion. [E.G.] looks over and she can see a dark penis going into a
white body. That’s how graphic she could see [sic].”).
273. Id. at 232.
274. Id. at 234.
275. Id. at 235. The court relied on the general instruction the trial court gave
advising jurors to not “allow bias or prejudice . . . to influence their
decisions,” as well as the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant on some
counts. Id. The court’s analysis of the comments’ impropriety suggested
confusion over why the prosecutor would have thought the comments were
relevant and how to balance the probative value against prejudicial effect.
See id. at 234. If the Colorado Supreme Court had some difficulty with that
analysis given ample time for reflection, that suggests it is unreasonable to
expect defense counsel to do this calculation effectively in deciding whether
to object in the moment.
276. State v. Mitchell, 783 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
277. Id. at 1254–55.
278. Id. The court did not discuss why sixteen separate mentions of “black” was
necessary or useful for identification, or why the prosecutor could not have
just talked about the larger and smaller male without reference to race, at
least after the first time. The court also noted that the comments were only
made in opening statements, which the prosecutor structured as a “mystery”
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While some descriptive reference to race is proper, the court failed to
analyze the repetitive nature of the sixteen separate references.279 The
court also emphasized that the “alleged misconduct was not central to
any critical issue in the case,”280 which is commonly part of harmlesserror analysis. The court also relied on the strength of the state’s case
and ultimately concluded that the defendant was not deprived of a fair
trial.281 The dissent, by contrast, noted that racial arguments need to
be more carefully scrutinized, and stated that “I cannot conceive of any
valid reason for those racial references.”282
These decisions, and many more like them, show the courts’ naïveté
about the severity and impact of racist prosecutorial rhetoric. Even if
these decisions can be justified in individual cases, collectively they
create a system that tolerates and even encourages prosecutors to use
racist prosecutorial rhetoric. The next section lays a foundation for
potential solutions to this current state of structural racism.

III. Focus on Trial Courts for Solutions
About Controlling Biases
The clear theme of the research described above in Part I(B) is that
decision-making improves when actors are aware of the ways in which
race affects decision-making. Therefore, this section focuses on raceconscious rather than colorblind solutions283 to the problem of racist
prosecutorial rhetoric. These solutions relate to court actions, as “courts
provide the primary restraint on prosecutorial misconduct” at trial.284
about what happened, and that in closing arguments the prosecutor referred
to them by name rather than description. See id.
279. For the importance of repetition, see supra notes 165–169 and accompanying
text.
280. Mitchell, 783 A.2d at 1254. Although the court said that, the court also
noted elsewhere in the opinion that the victims could not positively identify
the defendant, so identification did seem to be a critical issue. See id. at
1253.
281. Id. at 1255.
282. Id. at 1259 (Spear, J., dissenting). The dissent also used a race-switching
argument that if the robbery victims had been Black and the defendants
were white, the prosecutor would not have made sixteen references to the
perpetrators being white. Id.
283. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Normalizing Domination, 20 CUNY L. Rev. 493,
504 (2017) (“[T]here ought to be a reinvigoration of what race consciousness
means, even if that meaning forces us to stand contrary to the majoritarian
view that we live in a post-racial society.”).
284. Lyon, supra note 15, at 335–36; see also Alford, supra note 39, at 333 (“If
it is likely that White jurors possess negative stereotypes about Black
defendants, this creates a clear incentive for prosecutors to cater to jurors’
prejudices with racist argumentation, either overt or subtle. Given these
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Section A below argues that trial courts rather than appellate courts
are best positioned to provide that restraint. Section B argues why trial
courts should focus on prosecutors rather than treating prosecutors and
defense counsel equally. Section C summarizes the social science
research about controlling bias, also called debiasing strategies, which
provides the foundation for the specific strategies discussed below in
Part IV.
A.

Trial Courts are Better Positioned than
Appellate Courts to Spur Change

While changes to appellate review 285 and professional discipline
rules286 may also be useful in confronting racist prosecutorial rhetoric,
trial courts are in the best position to make an immediate and lasting
impact.287
First, trial courts are better positioned than appellate courts to
evaluate the context of challenged prosecutorial rhetoric and to see

incentives, it is the courts’ willingness to address covert racism that is
crucial to the creation of an effective deterrent.”); Green, supra note 268,
at 812–13 (discussing the organizational reasons why prosecutors’ offices
tend to support rather than serve to check prosecutorial misconduct);
Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing out of a Constitutional
Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post
Thompson, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 1243, 1281 (2011) (noting that the courts
providing a check on prosecutorial behavior is part of the constitutional
system of checks and balances between the three branches of government).
285. Appellate court analysis needs to be reshaped as well to deal with the
problems identified above. This article is the first of three dealing with
the various facets of racist prosecutorial misconduct. A future article will
discuss changes to harmless error and plain error analysis in these cases.
286. Professional discipline has generally not been a common or effective method
of checking prosecutorial behavior. See Grometstein & Balboni, supra note
284, at 1269 (discussing a study by the Center for Public Integrity of 11,000
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and noting that only thirty-four of
them led to professional discipline hearings). Some scholars have nevertheless
focused on use of the professional discipline system enforcing the ethics rules
as the best route to deal with prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Chris
Cialeo, [In]equality Under the Law: Remedying Unequal Antidiscrimination
Ethics Rules for Federal Prosecutors, 28 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 435, 437–
39 (2015); Green, supra note 268, at 810–14. A brief review of that
scholarship indicates that current ethics rules need to be strengthened, which
is something I also plan to explore in another follow-up article.
287. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and
Trial Judges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 675–76 (1972) (arguing for trial courts
to take a more active role in dealing with prosecutorial misconduct and
noting that “[i]t is perhaps unfortunate that the legal profession has come to
look to the appellate courts as the principal or almost exclusive source of
innovation in criminal procedure”).
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juror reactions.288 The “cold record” of an appellate transcript often fails
to include details, such as the prosecutor’s tone of voice or facial
expressions, that trial judges can observe and evaluate.289 While the
court reporter in one case noted that the prosecutor repeatedly said
“po-leese” rather than “police,”290 that kind of detail in the transcript
seems to be relatively rare and could easily have been invisible on
appeal or only made visible only through defense counsel’s argument.
Trial courts are also best positioned to confront prosecutors about
their use of stereotypes. Research supports the idea that explicitly
confronting individuals with their reliance on stereotypes can effectively
decrease their reliance on those stereotypes, at least temporarily. 291
Researchers found that when study participants were made aware of
the role of stereotype in their responses, “participant responses display–
ed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to responses given before
the confrontation).”292 Appellate court review does not provide this kind
of immediate confrontation, while trial judges can take a variety of
immediate actions during trial to provide this confrontation, as
explained below.
Additionally, trial courts possess broad powers to take action.293
While sources of trial court authority may vary by jurisdiction, judges
can generally rely on statutory authority, codes of ethics, and court
rules when controlling attorney courtroom behavior. 294 Additionally,
“[t]he doctrine of inherent judicial power permits the judicial branch to
take necessary actions to fulfill its constitutional functions, even when
those actions are not expressly authorized by constitution or statute.”295
This inherent power allows courts to control the conduct of judicial
proceedings.296 In exercising these various powers, judges have broad

288. Earle, supra note 34, at 1229.
289. Lyon, supra note 15, at 327.
290. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 553–54 (Wash. 2011).
291. Levinson, supra note 94, at 413.
292. Id. at 413–14.
293. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the
Adversary System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials,
2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 945, 972 (2008).
294. Ty Tasker, Sticks and Stones: Judicial Handling of Invective in Advocacy,
42 Judges’ J. 17, 18 (2003).
295. Backus, supra note 293, at 972.
296. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“[W]e must remember that
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that
will prevent the prejudice at its inception.”).
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discretion, 297 including the power to impose contempt sanctions. 298
Contempt sanctions can be imposed against prosecutors as well as
against defense counsel, although courts generally impose these sanc–
tions much more frequently against defense counsel.299 Trial courts may
even have an ethical obligation to act: “The trial judge has the respon–
sibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests
of the public in the administration of criminal justice.”300 As explained
above, racist prosecutorial rhetoric implicates both the rights of
individual defendants and the broader public interest in the fair and
impartial administration of justice. These various sources of authority
support actions by individual trial judges, and judges can also “suggest,
and express support of, new legislation, rulemaking, and ethics
guidelines where needed.”301
On the other hand, when trial courts fail to confront racist
prosecutorial rhetoric, that failure encourages it to continue and even
to worsen.302 Several commentators have raised concerns about “ethical
297. Backus, supra note 293, at 972. In fact, these powers are generally so broad
that valid concerns have been raised about the potential for “idiosyncratic”
and “erratic rules.” Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional
Limitations on the Judicial Contempt Power Part One: The Conflict Between
Advocacy and Contempt, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 477, 483 (1990). My point here
is not to delineate the outer limits of these powers, but to demonstrate that
trial courts have ample authority to take meaningful action to deal with racist
prosecutorial rhetoric.
298. D. Alana Leaphart, Authority of the Trial Judge, 77 Geo. L.J. 1009, 1023
(1989).
299. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 287, at 673–74; see also Raveson, supra note
297, at 582–83 (noting that defense counsel are cited for contempt far more
than prosecutors, and discussing various factors that may account for this
disparity, which does not seem to reflect more misconduct by defense counsel
than prosecutors).
300. Backus, supra note 293, at 962 (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice Special Functions of the Trial Judge 6-1.1
(3d ed. 2000)). While the ABA Standards are not mandatory in any
jurisdiction, courts nevertheless “giv[e] them considerable weight.” Id. at
n.83.
301. Tasker, supra note 294, at 21. As discussed in Part IV, some specific steps
should be taken by individual trial judges, but many of the solutions would
benefit from rulemaking in the form of court rules or model jury instructions.
302. Green, supra note 268, at 812 (arguing that courts should not ignore
“minor, but visible, prosecutorial infractions” because “[c]ontemporary
social science teachings offer reasons to worry that this strategy fosters
not only recurring low-level misconduct but more serious wrongdoing.”);
see also Tasker, supra note 294, at 21 (quoting People v. Travis, 276 P.2d
193, 199 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)) (noting that courts should express
“disapproval rather than . . . tacit approval” to minimize incentives for
attorneys to engage in inappropriate behavior).
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slippage” or “slippery slope” regarding courts failing to discipline
prosecutors.303 When prosecutors get away with “overreaching in little
visible ways,” they may become more willing to commit more serious
misconduct.304 Again, trial courts are better positioned than appellate
courts to provide the kind of corrective interventions needed, and
research shows that their failure to do so may have significant conse–
quences for the overall pattern of prosecutorial behavior, regardless of
what appellate courts decide later.305
B.

Trial Courts Should Focus on Prosecutors

The solutions described below focus on prosecutors; they should not
be applied as written to defense counsel.306 While defense counsel might
certainly use racist rhetoric, several reasons support treating prose–
cutors differently.307
303. See, e.g., Green, supra note 268, at 813 (discussing “ethical slippage”); Earle,
supra note 34, at 1214 (noting that courts allowing racism to go unaddressed
perpetuates injustice and “erodes the safeguard of a fair trial”).
304. Green, supra note 268, at 813. In those situations, the failure of courts and
other entities to provide any check for misconduct may blind them to the fact
that their behavior is inappropriate. See infra note 409 and accompanying
text.
305. Green, supra note 268, at 810, 812.
306. Application of these concepts to civil cases is beyond the scope of this article.
307. In focusing on prosecutors, I do not want to minimize the dangers from
defense counsel using racist rhetoric, particularly when representing white
defendants being prosecuted for crimes against Black victims, and some
scholars have used that lens to argue for rules about racial references in
criminal trials that would apply to both prosecutors and defense counsel.
See, e.g., Jonathan Markovitz, “A Spectacle of Slavery Unwilling to Die”:
Curbing Reliance on Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense Cases, 5 UC Irvine
L. Rev. 873, 931 (2015) (“Several scholars have suggested prohibiting any
discussion of race at trial, or developing ‘race shield’ laws, modeled after rape
shield laws, that would prohibit reliance on racial imagery, with several
exceptions.”). I certainly do not intend for this article to make it harder to
prosecute cases of racial violence against victims of color, and I have tried to
craft solutions below that allow prosecutors to demonstrate to courts the
need for racially conscious language and theories. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra
note 3, at 2242 (“Race-conscious, community-oriented duties to investigate
and prosecute cases of racially motivated violence correspond with the public
purposes of criminal justice.”). But even in these cases, prosecutors should
avoid narratives that reinforce “hierarchies of white dominance and black
subordination.” Id. at 2243. In other words, prosecutors should be careful to
avoid racist rhetoric, even when they might think they are using that rhetoric
for a just cause. Instead, I argue that prosecutors should avoid in all cases
rhetoric that would be racist when used against a Black defendant, even if
that rhetoric is arguably non-racist in a particular case. See infra note 409.
Finally, although the role of defense counsel in countering racist prosecutorial
rhetoric is beyond the scope of this article, others have produced good
scholarship on this topic. See generally, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 69. And I
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As Professor Anna Roberts points out, “an examination of some of
the core structures of the criminal justice system reveals that
asymmetry is a central component of the system’s design and of its
attempts to achieve fairness.” 308 The Constitution provides criminal
defendants with several rights that are not provided to the prosecution,
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right not to be
compelled to self-incriminate.309 Courts interpreting these rights have
reinforced asymmetry, for example in placing the burden on the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a criminal convic–
tion.310
Additionally, prosecutors and defense counsel play different roles
within the system. As noted above, prosecutors have an ethical duty to
“seek justice” rather than to win convictions at any cost, while defense
counsel must represent their clients and seek acquittals or other clientcentered responses without an eye towards broader issues of justice.311
Prosecutors are also representatives of the government, and
government representatives have a particularly important role to both
literally enforce anti-discrimination laws and act within the spirit of
those laws when performing other tasks.312 In using racist rhetoric, “a
prosecutor would, at the very least, be acting contrary to the spirit
of . . . antidiscrimination laws as a means of enforcing other laws.”313
And when judges fail to impose consequences on prosecutors for using
racist rhetoric, that failure “effectively results in two branches of
government sanctioning such discriminatory conduct.”314
Jurors’ views of prosecutors and defense counsel also matter. Jurors
and other members of the public generally do not understand why
agree with the Critical Race Theory scholarship that emphasizes the import–
ance of ensuring that defense counsel can tell their client’ stories when
representing people of color. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 42,
at 43–56 (discussing legal storytelling and narrative analysis within Critical
Race Theory, including how these techniques help reveal “ignored or
alternative realities” and how counter-storytelling helps provide a “cure for
silencing”). So while it may be appropriate to limit the rhetoric available to
defense counsel, at least in some circumstances, the nuances of that issue are
beyond the scope of this article, and courts can and should focus at this point
on prosecutorial rhetoric.
308. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1539.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1540.
312. See Cialeo, supra note 286, at 441.
313. Id.
314. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 54, at 333–34 (noting the danger in the
government validating “the basic premise of Plessy—that people of color can
be permissibly othered and degraded”).
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defense counsel must extend their zealous advocacy even to guilty
clients.315 Research also shows that jurors’ explicit and implicit biases
both favor the prosecution.316 “Because of her unique position, juries
invest the prosecutor with authority beyond that of an advocate, and
the prosecutor must be accountable for that authority.” 317 The
combination of these factors suggest that racist prosecutorial rhetoric
poses asymmetrical danger to the integrity of the fairness of the
criminal justice system, and they support the idea that asymmetrical
treatment of prosecutors better ensures the goal of fairness.
C.

Overview of Debiasing Strategies from Social Science Research

While the research described above presents a somewhat daunting
picture of how many different ways race can affect decision-making in
the criminal justice system, that research also provides a much more
hopeful picture regarding several effective debiasing strategies.318 This
section summarizes five strategies that collectively provide the founda–
tion for the specific solutions discussed in Part IV. These strategies are
(1) considering the effect of biases and stereotypes on decision-making;
(2) making race salient in a way that empowers controlling the effect
of biases; (3) priming egalitarianism; (4) reducing cognitive load; and
(5) making space for counter-narratives.
An important first step is recognizing the existence of implicit bias,
dispelling the illusion that our decision-making is color-blind. 319 For
example, studies show that simply raising awareness of potential
implicit bias in decision-making was shown to lead to enrolling a more
diverse medical school class and a reduction in basketball referees
calling fouls in a racially disparate way, without any changes to the
processes used in making these decisions.320 This increased awareness
315. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1549.
316. Id. at 1529 (“The explicit biases include widespread assumptions that police
and prosecutors are unimpeachable, that the guilt of the accused is likely,
and that the presumption of innocence is a fiction.”) (footnotes omitted).
Roberts also notes that jurors’ implicit biases “tend to disfavor people of
color, and thus a disproportionate number of criminal defendants. These
implicit biases can affect all of the main tasks that jurors are called upon
to perform: evaluation of evidence, evaluation of behavior, recall of facts,
and judgment of guilt.” Id. at 1529–30 (footnotes omitted).
317. Lyon, supra note 15, at 335.
318. “[S]tudies consistently show that implicit bias can be controlled and
regulated, and that its operation is not inevitable.” Selmi, supra note 26,
at 232. This research does not mean that prejudice has an easy fix, but it
does suggest that people with egalitarian values can control the effect of
stereotypes on their decisions. See id.
319. Lee, supra note 33, at 866.
320. Selmi, supra note 26, at 231.
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helps people exercise more care in decision-making, particularly for
those who are internally motivated to self-correct.321
That insight relates to the second key strategy—making race salient
in a way that empowers individuals to control biases. Race salience
means making decision-makers “aware of racial issues that can bias
their decision-making, like the operation of racial stereotypes.”322 This
increased awareness through race salience encourages decision-makers
with egalitarian values “to consciously suppress stereotype-congruent
responses that would otherwise be automatic.”323 Race salience can also
help reduce bias in high-prejudice individuals who may try to appear
egalitarian, in compliance with broader societal norms toward egali–
tarianism. 324 For both egalitarian and high-prejudiced individuals,
making race salient provides motivation for them to avoid allowing
stereotypes to affect their judgments.325
Several studies demonstrate that making race salient can even the
scales for Black and white defendants, while failure to do so leads to
disparate treatment.326 For example, one study showed that white mock
jurors were more likely to convict Black defendants than white defen–
dants and to recommend longer sentences when race was not
mentioned, but when race was explicitly mentioned, that disparity
disappeared.327 Another study found that white jurors were more likely
to perceive white defendants as more honest and moral, and Black
defendants as more violent, when race was not salient.328
321. Richardson, supra note 22, at 887–88; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at
230 (“Increasing awareness is likely to have the strongest effect on those
who are receptive to the notion that implicit bias is a real issue, and that
discrimination remains a pervasive societal force.”).
322. Lee, supra note 23, at 1586.
323. Id.; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at 230 (noting that those most likely to
be able to control biases are those who have egalitarian ideals but are
likely to underreport their own explicit biases).
324. Lee, supra note 23, at 1608; see also Selmi, supra note 26, at 229–30
(discussing studies showing “that people are likely to act in a less biased
fashion when they know their actions are subject to review or judgment”;
these studies included one on the effect of televising baseball games to a
national audience on umpires’ strike zones and bias and another on biased
cardiac care to Black patients).
325. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1258.
326. Lee, supra note 23, at 1588–89 (“Making race salient does not give the Black
defendant an advantage over the similarly situated White defendant.
Failing to make race salient, however, seems to lead to unequal treatment
of similarly situated defendants, with the Black defendant receiving the
short end of the stick.”).
327. See Thompson, supra note 63, at 1295.
328. Id. at 1295–96.
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Race can be made salient in a criminal trial in a variety of ways,
but simply having a victim and defendant of different races is not
enough.329 Similarly, race is not made salient just by making decisionmakers aware of the race of the defendant or victim.330 Instead, research
shows that jurors are better at guarding against the influence of
prejudice in cases involving allegations of discrimination or that are
otherwise more obviously racially charged. 331 For example, one
experiment involved a fight between two teammates on a high school
basketball team.332 In both scenarios, one player was Black and the
other was white; the only difference between the two scenarios was the
addition of a single sentence that the defendant had been subjected to
racial remarks and unfair criticisms of teammates in the other racial
group earlier in the season.333 In the version of the scenario without that
sentence, mock jurors voted to convict the Black defendant 90% of the
time and the white defendant only 70% of the time.334 In the scenario
with the one additional sentence making race salient, however, both
defendants were convicted at the same rate.335
Several scholars have argued that courts should make race salient
by raising the issue of bias or stereotyping in “routine” cases involving
defendants of color that do not involve facts that more obviously make
race relevant. For example, Professor Cynthia Lee argues that defense
counsel should use voir dire to question jurors about potential racial
bias 336 and should use opening statements to educate jurors on the
potential role of bias in decision-making and frame the story in a way
that makes the jury more able to see the relevance of race.337 Other
authors stress the role of jury instructions in making jurors aware of

329. Lee, supra note 23, at 1563.
330. Id. at 1586.
331. See Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (citing studies). “In other words, the very
notion of ‘playing the race card’ is misleading. By virtue of . . . automatic
and connectionist processes . . . ‘race cards’ are always present and having
an effect, even when they are face down or still in the deck.” Blasi, supra
note 28, at 1274.
332. Id. at 1247.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. See infra Section IV(A) regarding using voir dire and jury instructions
to effectively make race salient.
336. Lee, supra note 23, at 1590–91; see also Hunt, supra note 18, at 283
(suggesting that jurors could be asked to reflect on their own racial biases
during voir dire).
337. Lee, supra note 23, at 1593–94; see also Lee, supra note 33, at 862–63.

90

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

the potential impact of implicit bias on decision-making and urging
jurors to guard against relying on stereotypes in decision-making.338
In raising the idea of biased decision-making, however, approach
matters. As noted above, the term “implicit bias” is more effective than
“unconscious racism” in suggesting that these biases are controllable.339
Furthermore, terms like “unconscious racism” or “aversive racism”
suggest individual immorality. 340 Strategies that come across as
moralizing are more likely to be counter-productive rather than helpful,
as “the seemingly universal drive to maintain our self-image plays a role
in generating stereotypes and prejudice.” 341 On the other hand,
“deviation from rational decisionmaking is not simply a cognitive glitch,
but a meaningful cultural statement that reflects the way people
unknowingly carry society’s weaknesses with them at all times.”342 So
the framing of these issues for jurors should generally include reference
back to the underlying research into biased decision-making 343 and
should emphasize the ability to counteract implicit biases and stereo–
types through a focus on non-prejudiced beliefs.344
That leads to the third debiasing strategy, priming for egalitarian
beliefs. Race consciousness is not by itself enough to undo structural
racism, as “[o]ne may have a subordinationist race consciousness or an
338. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias
in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149,
169 (2010); Thompson, supra note 63, at 1301–06.
339. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
340. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276. While this insight is arguably inconsistent with
my use of “racist” throughout this article, the term here refers to the rhetoric
rather than the person using it. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Additionally, this article is intended to appeal to people (particularly
prosecutors and judges) with egalitarian values and low prejudice, to help
them change their approaches to this issue by giving them a broader
framework for understanding the racism inherent in certain rhetorical
choices. See also Blasi, supra note 28, at 1281 (noting that another scholar’s
explanation of “institutional racism” is helpful because “despite the emotive
implications of the term, it is at bottom an account of how very ordinary
and unremarkable are the methods by which we maintain structures of
inequality. . . . [T]his account . . . [is] less likely to encounter the
resistance generated by more moralizing and accusatory stances.”). Thus,
the term “racist prosecutorial rhetoric” should be seen as conveying urgency
rather than moral judgment.
341. Id. at 1271.
342. Levinson, supra note 94, at 420.
343. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276.
344. See Armour, supra note 68, at 744 (discussing “the possibility of inhibiting
and replacing stereotype-congruent responses with nonprejudiced responses
derived from nonprejudiced personal beliefs”).
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egalitarian race consciousness.”345 Making race salient is important, but
it should be done in a way that furthers an egalitarian approach to race
consciousness. While racist rhetoric can activate stereotypes and prime
for prejudice, antidiscrimination norms can also be primed and
activated.346 For example, jurors can be instructed that they should not
allow their verdicts to be influenced by bias or prejudice. A recent study
concluded that an instruction with language about avoiding bias or
prejudice, even without mentioning race, was helpful in priming for
egalitarianism. 347 That study’s author concluded that “explicit race
salience and egalitarianism may be additive, such that their com–
bination is more powerful at reducing biases than either alone.” 348
Similarly, attorneys can use voir dire or closing arguments to remind
jurors to guard against biases, reinforcing egalitarianism without
specifically referring to race.349
A fourth strategy involves reducing cognitive loads.350 “Studies have
shown that cognitive load interferes with the ability to process
information in a controlled manner, making people more vulnerable to
stereotyping and other mental shortcuts.”351 This occurs because people
draw on the same mental resources for directing their attention, holding
things in working memory, reasoning, and controlling expressions of
bias. 352 In such situations, relying on stereotypes provides a mental
shortcut, but that heightens the risk of biased behavior.353 Reducing
cognitive load, by contrast, minimizes the need for reliance on mental
345. Ellis, supra note 283, at 500 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 504 (“Race
consciousness can be constructive or destructive, and it is our choice as to
whether to be complicit with an erasure of race consciousness that facilitates
a new racial domination, or by our consciousness to work to articulate a
racial awareness that bolsters our democratic values.”).
346. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276.
347. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1730–31.
348. Id.
349. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1276.
350. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Accountability as a Debiasing Strategy: Testing
the Effect of Racial Diversity in Employment Committees, 103 Iowa L.
Rev. 1593, 1601 (2018); see also Hunt, supra note 18, at 275 (“[L]owering
the cognitive demands on jurors may help them to avoid the influence of
prejudice.”).
351. Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice: Misunderstanding and Bias in
Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 593,
648 (2019); see also Thompson, supra note 63, at 1249 (noting that high
cognitive load makes individuals under stress or pressed for time more likely
to rely on stereotypes).
352. Jillian K. Swencionis & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Psychological Science of
Racial Bias and Policing, 23 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 398, 402 (2017).
353. See id.
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shortcuts like stereotypes and encourages more thoughtful decisionmaking.354
Finally, courts should provide opportunities for counter-narratives.
Counter-narratives are a useful tool for replacing toxic prior mental
associations with new, more positive associations.355 Professor Jewel’s
article on neurorhetoric stresses the importance of counternarratives:
“To the extent that rhetoric produces collective neural pathways that
reinforce racial oppression and subordination, the identification and
deployment of alternative discourses have the potential to carve out
healing pathways that can reshape brains, both individually and
collectively.”356 Many scholars have written about the importance of
defense counsel offering counter-narratives to humanize their clients.357
But there is also an important systemic component to counternarratives as a debiasing strategy.358 As discussed above, stereotypes
come in part from culture, and repeated references to those stereotypes
more firmly entrenches them in our individual and collective under–
standings.359 Law’s emphasis on repetition of rules and standardized
language “creates collective neural pathways that become collectively
entrenched.”360 Thus, in making race salient and priming egalitarianism,
courts can foster counter-narratives within the criminal justice system.
The next Part below offers concrete strategies for doing so.

IV. Specific Proposed Solutions
This section offers specific actions trial courts can use to implement
the general debiasing strategies discussed above. Section A describes
creating an effective foundation to guard against juror biases through
voir dire and pretrial jury instructions. Section B proposes using a
354. See Williams, supra note 350, at 1601 n.45.
355. Walter I. Gonçalves, Jr., Narrative, Culture, and Individuation: A Criminal
Defense Lawyer’s Race-Conscious Approach to Reduce Implicit Bias for
Latinxs, 18 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 333, 374 (2020).
356. Jewel, supra note 18, at 665.
357. See, e.g., Gonçalves, Jr., supra note 355, at 338 (emphasizing the value of
client-centered strategies such as “presenting important life experiences of
the client” to humanize the client and “present [them] as a unique person”);
Blasi, supra note 28, at 1270 (discussing the “bind” of defense counsel in
deciding whether to present stereotype-inconsistent information about a
client, which both helps the client by encouraging the jury to view the client
as exceptional and also reinforces the broader stereotype).
358. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 94, at 407 (discussing the value of “exposure
to ‘counterstereotypes’” and arguing that cultural solutions must be
pursued).
359. See supra Parts I(B)(2) and I(B)(5).
360. Jewel, supra note 18, at 681.
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checklist of racist prosecutorial rhetoric and requiring prosecutors to
bring a motion in limine when they believe that race is relevant to the
case. That section should prevent much racist prosecutorial rhetoric,
but not all, so Section C offers strategies for dealing with problems that
occur during trial. Section D suggests a method for tracking violations
across trials and offices to better facilitate dealing with repeat offenders.
These solutions would work best in combination with one another, but
even implementing some of these approaches would be a marked
improvement over the current situation.
A.

Create an Effective Foundation

The two strategies discussed in this section build on the race
salience research described above to create a foundation for minimizing
the effect of any racist prosecutorial rhetoric that might occur at trial.
These solutions are specifically targeted at making the jury aware of
implicit biases and on guard against relying on stereotypes or biases.361
While these strategies focus on the jury, they should also help make
race salient to prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges, which creates
a foundation for the solutions discussed in subsequent sections that are
focused on those actors.
1.

Use Voir Dire to Make Race Salient

Courts can use voir dire to make race salient.362 While courts are
only required to use voir dire to deal with racial bias in a limited set of
cases, they have broad discretion to do so in any case.363 Some judges
have been hesitant to use this authority, fearing that calling attention
361. This approach is consistent with the theory in some of the sources on racist
prosecutorial rhetoric that frame the issue as violating the Sixth
Amendment’s right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257
P.3d 551, 557–58 (Wash. 2011); Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 1206,
1208 (2013) (statement of Sotomoyor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);
see also Earle, supra note 34, at 1217–18 (arguing that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury requires a pragmatic focus on
outcomes, while Equal Protection analysis bogs down over questions of a
prosecutor’s intent and whether actions were harmless). It should also help
prevent the kind of racist rhetoric used by a juror during deliberations in
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, in which two jurors reported that a third juror,
an ex-law enforcement officer, explicitly referenced that experience to argue
that Mexican men “believe they could do whatever they wanted with
women” and that “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being
aggressive toward women and young girls.” 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). And
even if it does not prevent such rhetoric, it should give the other jurors
ammunition to explain why that approach should not be used in
deliberations. See Cicchini, supra note 145, at 892.
362. Lee, supra note 23, at 1590. Voir dire is the process of questioning jurors in
advance of the jury selection process. See id.
363. Id. at 1592; Thompson, supra note 63, at 1281 n.303.

94

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

to race will only exacerbate implicit bias.364 But the research on race
salience described above demonstrates that instinct is incorrect; there
is a far greater danger of implicit bias affecting decision-making when
courts take a color-blind approach rather than making race salient.365
If courts agree to use voir dire to address racial biases, they should
allow attorneys for the parties to do the questioning on this topic, rather
than doing it themselves.366 Research shows that jurors are more likely
to answer attorneys more candidly but are more likely to give judges
the answer that they think the judge wants to hear. 367 Therefore,
judicially conducted voir dire may actually obscure rather than reveal
some biases.368
Whoever does the questioning, though, should be careful about how
questions are phrased. Closed questions that ask jurors if they can be
fair are unlikely to be helpful. 369 Instead, questions should be openended to educate jurors on implicit bias and ask them to reflect on it
and guard against its impact.370
2.

Give Jury Instruction(s), including a Debiasing Instruction,
Before Opening Statements

Another common suggestion for making race salient is through the
use of jury instructions. 371 Many authors have offered a variety of
different instructions that could be used for this purpose; 372 these
364. Bennett, supra note 338, at 169.
365. See supra notes 283, 322–338 and accompanying text.
366. Bennett, supra note 338, at 160. For attorneys who would prefer to have
the court conduct this voir dire, see infra note 370 and accompanying text.
367. Bennett, supra note 338, at 160.
368. Id. If judges choose to conduct voir dire on this topic, attorneys can still
request permission to give potential jurors a questionnaire with race-relevant
questions. Lee, supra note 23, at 1591.
369. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 338, at 160 (suggesting that typical closed
questions about fairness only reach explicit bias and do not do anything
to help detect or prevent implicit biases); Lee, supra note 33, at 868.
370. See, e.g., Gonçalves, Jr., supra note 355, at 354 (stressing that defense
counsel should use voir dire to educate jurors about implicit bias); Lee,
supra note 33, at 846–47 (stressing that jurors should reflect on how implicit
bias could impact decision-making); Bilotta et al., supra note 4, at 236
(discussing social science research supporting the idea of asking jurors to
reflect on racial biases during voir dire).
371. See supra notes 338, 347–349 and accompanying text regarding effectively
using jury instructions to make salient both race and egalitarianism.
372. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1301–06 (including an instruction on
life experiences that does not mention race, as well as instructions on general
racial stereotypes and specific stereotypes that have been invoked in a
particular case); Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1718–19, 1730–33 (describing an
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different models may be more or less appropriate in different cases.373
Judges may want to have a standard instruction educating jurors on
implicit bias and urging them to avoid relying on stereotypes or biases
in their decision-making.374 This instruction should avoid language that
inadvertently suggests that bias is inevitable or difficult to control, as
well as any language with a moralizing tone.375 Prosecutors and defense
counsel could argue for the appropriateness of additional instructions
in specific cases.
The best approach, however, would be to have committees on
model jury instructions in each jurisdiction evaluate their current
instructions and look for opportunities to refine their model instruc–
tions.376 A rules committee would be well-suited to focus on the clarity
of the instruction, as clarity matters. Several studies demonstrate that
experiment testing the effectiveness of a variety of different instructions,
concluding that egalitarian and race-salience instructions were most effective
when combined and rejecting the effectiveness of “self-affirming” or “proce–
dural justice” instructions); Bennett, supra note 338, at 169 n.85 (quoting the
instruction that Judge Bennett gives routinely). Some of these instructions
give detail about the ways in which implicit biases can affect judgments. See,
e.g., Thompson, supra note 63, at 1302 (including specific language about
biases affecting memory, judgments about believability, and decision-making).
373. For example, Thompson’s instruction on life experiences would be useful in
courts that routinely give a similar instruction or in cases in which the
prosecutor argued that jurors should rely on their life experiences in making
credibility determinations between people of different races. See Thompson,
supra note 63, at 1301.
374. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 338, at 169 n.85 (containing Judge Bennett’s
standard instruction, which among other things asks jurors “to recognize
that all of us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we
make. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I
strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the evidence and resist any
urge to reach a verdict influenced by stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit
biases.”). Judge Bennett’s standard instruction is fairly similar in approach,
although with slightly different language, to the egalitarian instruction that
Ingriselli found to reduce bias. See supra notes 347–348 and accompanying
text.
375. For example, both Judge Bennett’s instruction and Ingriselli’s egalitarian
instruction refers to “unconscious bias,” but “implicit bias” would be better
language to use, and courts should avoid language about biases being
difficult to control. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
376. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1290. Thompson has an extended discussion of
pattern jury instructions in various jurisdictions; that approach seems benefi–
cial because these instructions are produced through a deliberative process.
Id. at 1290–93. Additionally, trial courts would clearly be authorized to give
these instructions, while they are sometimes reluctant to do so in the absence
of a model instruction. See, e.g., State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 (Iowa
2017) (noting that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested implicit
bias instruction because the trial court wrongly concluded that it did not have
the authority to do so).
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legal standard instructions can be hard for jurors to understand. 377
When jurors have difficulty understanding the instructions, those
instructions are less effective.378
Beyond the language used, courts should also focus on timing. The
research indicates that it is more effective to give jury instructions
generally, and debiasing instructions in particular, before the jury hears
evidence. 379 When jurors are given instructions before they hear
evidence, those instructions provide a framework for evaluating the
evidence and help them focus on and remember relevant evidence rather
than improper considerations such as race.380 Relatedly, pre-evidence
instructions “prime jurors to organize the evidence according to legal
principles rather than personal biases.”381
An empirical study supported these conclusions, showing a greater
debiasing effect when debiasing instructions were given before the
evidence as compared to when those instructions were given after the
evidence.382 The study’s author also found that “explicit race salience
only mattered when there were egalitarian instructions presented preevidence”; in other words, explicit race salience was not enough without
also priming egalitarianism before the jurors heard the evi–
dence. 383 Another study indicates that providing jury instructions
377. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1716.
378. Id. at 1716–17.
379. See id. at 1730–31; Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on
Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second
Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 423, 439–40 (1985) (describing experiments in
real trials, explaining that judges and counsel in the majority of cases overall
and all the criminal cases found preinstruction to be helpful). While some
participants in these experiments expressed ambivalence, the study’s author
concluded “that most, if not all, of the ambivalence toward preinstruction
stems from unfamiliarity with the procedure and the increased burden it may
place on the court and counsel. Not a single respondent pointed to any
negative effect of preinstruction on the jury.” Id. at 442.
380. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1715; see also Sand & Reiss, supra note 379, at
438 (footnote omitted) (“[B]ecause attention and memory processes are more
acute when a perceiver has an understanding of what he or she is looking
for, preinstruction may enhance the jurors’ ability to remember the
information presented at trial.”).
381. Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1715.
382. Id. at 1729. Ingriselli also found that timing intersects with clarity: “Timing
should have less of an effect if jurors do not understand the instructions, as
they cannot form a framework within which to evaluate evidence regardless
of when the instructions are presented.” Id. at 1716.
383. Id. at 1731. That finding conflicts at least to some extent with earlier
research on race salience; Ingriselli suggests that prior studies of race
salience used interracial crimes, while her hypothetical did not. Id. She
concludes that because she “excluded the victim’s race in order to avoid
this confounding factor, the data suggests that perhaps the results from past
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before opening statements can also help focus counsel on the issues
presented in the case, similar to the effect of a pretrial conference.384
The Supreme Court recently noted with approval the process of
instructing the jury “at the outset of the case” as one of several things
that can help reduce racial bias in jury deliberations.385 Thus, courts
should give some debiasing instruction prior to opening statements in
cases where the social science research indicates that race could affect
juror decision-making without their awareness.386
B.

Prevent Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric

This section focuses on strategies for preventing the use of racist
prosecutorial rhetoric during trials. It aims to give prosecutors and
judges the necessary tools to recognize rhetoric that is racist and the
incentives to use those tools effectively. 387 Specifically, this section
proposes that judges adopt a checklist that clearly identifies racist
prosecutorial rhetoric and flatly prohibits the use of most of this
rhetoric at trial, while also providing a mechanism for prosecutors to
argue race-sensitive issues in individual cases when appropriate. The
checklist would help well-intentioned prosecutors avoid inadvertent use
of racist rhetoric, and it would make it easier for judges to provide
remedies when prosecutors do use that rhetoric. Additionally, the
checklist would put prosecutors on notice that they need to file a motion
in limine seeking permission to raise racial issues and to clarify the
boundaries of appropriate argument, so that individual cases can be
treated appropriately while still generally preventing improper argu–
ment.
1.

Use a Checklist to Clarify What Language is Potentially Racist

Checklists have long been recognized as a valuable tool for avoiding
biased decision-making. Legal decision-makers have relied on studies in
the medical context about how use of checklists can improve decisionstudies have been driven in part by an interaction between the defendant’s
race and the victim’s race rather than by explicit race salience alone.” Id.
384. Sand & Reiss, supra note 379, at 441.
385. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).
386. The debiasing instruction should be given in conjunction with other
foundational instructions, such as the reasonable doubt standard, rather
than by itself. See Ingriselli, supra note 56, at 1730. That was the design in
Ingriselli’s study, although she does not discuss it separately. However, it is
logical that a debiasing instruction would be connected to other instructions
about how jurors should decide, rather than talking only about race or bias.
387. See Markovitz, supra note 307, at 933 (“[P]art of the effort to curtail the
influence of racist stereotyping in self-defense determinations must involve
providing judges and prosecutors with resources and incentives to take an
active role in identifying the problem”).
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making by supporting good performance rather than threatening
punishment for poor performance.388 “Checklists can help reduce biased
judgments because having predetermined criteria to guide decisionmaking can hinder people’s unintentional tendency to change the
criteria upon which their decisions are based in order to fit their
preferred course of action.”389
A checklist in this context would provide some clarity around
rhetoric that is inherently racist, although of course line-drawing would
be challenging. It is fairly easy to say that some references, such as the
explicit use of racial slurs, should be prohibited, but “subtle racist
appeals that could be interpreted as having nonracist meanings” are
more difficult to deal with.390 Various scholars have suggested ways to
categorize racist rhetoric; these approaches all have their own strengths
and weaknesses.391 Courts adopting their own checklists may want to
consider these other approaches, but this article proposes a structure
based on whether or not the prosecutor explicitly refers to race or a
racial stereotype, whether the prosecutor uses coded language to do so,
and whether the racial reference has more probative value than
prejudicial effect. Each of these categories is explained in more detail
below, with examples drawn from reported cases to illustrate how the
categories would work; it is impossible to be comprehensive, however,
so readers should not conclude that potential examples not included
below would be appropriate.392 Appendix A provides a sample checklist
using these categories that courts could adopt or modify.

388. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Jennifer Blasser, Keith A. Findley, Ronald F.
Wright, Jennifer E. Laurin & Cookie Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady
and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best
Practices, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1974–75 (2010) (explaining an ABA
report relying on Continuous Quality Improvement studies in medicine);
Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in
Material-Witness Detentions, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1333, 1380–81 (2012)
(discussing use of checklists to improve decision-making, including a project
in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office to create conviction integrity
programs using similar principles); Richardson, supra note 22, at 891
(discussing the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office use of checklists to
help attorneys guard against implicit bias in their handling of cases).
389. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public
Defender Triage, 122 Yale L.J. 2626, 2645 (2013).
390. Markovitz, supra note 307, at 932.
391. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 68, at 767–68 (summarizing some of the earlier
approaches, including tests that focus on symbolism and cultural meaning);
Earle, supra note 34, at 1233–40 (discussing different strategies for handling
explicit references to race versus indirect references to race).
392. Thompson, supra note 63, at 1303.
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a.

Prohibit Use of Racial Slurs and Explicit References to Stereotypes

First, and hopefully uncontroversially, courts should absolutely
prohibit prosecutors from using racial slurs. “Racial slurs universally
are considered prejudicial and therefore impermissible.”393 For example,
the prosecutor’s use of a variant of the n-word to mean hatred of Black
people would fall under this absolute prohibition.394 There is no place
for prosecutors to use racial slurs in their arguments. Even when the
slur comes from the defendant’s language or that of a witness, the
prosecutor can refer to “the slur” rather than repeating the language.395
Additionally, courts should absolutely prohibit prosecutors from
explicitly appealing to stereotypes. For example, the use of animal
imagery should be prohibited.396 As discussed above, courts sometimes
justify a prosecutor’s comparison of the defendant to a Bengal tiger, a
rabid dog, or a snake, to give just a few examples. 397 Prosecutors
sometimes use movie references to similar effect, such as referring to
King Kong or calling the defendant a monster. 398 While “[v]ivid
expression and exaggeration for effect are many an attorney’s stock-intrade,”399 use of this imagery activates the most pernicious stereotypes
and appeals to emotions in ways that are likely to anesthetize the jury
from resisting dehumanization.400 Dehumanization is particularly likely
to invoke stereotypes and influence the jury when used against
defendants of color, and this dehumanizing rhetoric is never necessary
for prosecutors to argue their cases. Courts should require prosecutors
to look for ways to frame their arguments that focus on the specific
393. Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process: VI. Racial
Bias and Prosecutorial Conduct at Trial, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1588, 1590
(1988).
394. See Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 504 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). I am not
suggesting that the prosecutor could not elicit witness testimony about a
defendant’s use of racial slurs.
395. That was apparently the situation in Ivery; the prosecutor apparently intended
to argue that Black victims deserve justice. In cases involving testimony about
a defendant’s or witness’s use of racial slurs, that issue should be analyzed
under Evidence Rule 403, but the prosecutor can emphasize the slur in
argument without repeating it.
396. See Heller, supra note 19.
397. See supra notes 213–225 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 2016) (involving both
King Kong and monster references); Lyon, supra note 15, at 330 (discussing a
case where the prosecutor referred to the movie “Gorillas in the Mist” to invoke
the “black ape” stereotype).
399. Bennett, 842 F.3d at 322.
400. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (discussing Jewel’s explana–
tion for the effectiveness of dehumanizing rhetoric in Nazi Germany).
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evidence.401 For example, prosecutors can argue the viciousness of the
crime without using an animal or monster image for the perpetrator.402
Similarly, courts should prohibit other language that directly
invokes racial stereotypes. For example, Professor Sherri Lynn Johnson
described several cases with explicit invocation of racial stereotypes,
such as referring to Native Americans committing crimes because they
are unable to handle liquor.403 Similarly, the prosecutor who sang a
Dixie song referencing “the land of cotton” invoked slavery and the
range of stereotypes associated with it.404 And several cases discussed
above played on stereotypes of sexually inappropriate behavior towards
white women, while some cases involved inflammatory language about
immigration status and dishonesty.405 Prosecutors should stick to the
facts of the cases at hand rather than contextualizing them within
broader narratives founded on these stereotypes.
Courts should also prohibit explicit references to race that, in
context, suggest that the crime is worse because of the race of the
participants involved. As discussed above, this line of argument often
comes up in sexual assault cases, where the prosecutors link the victim’s
fear to the race of the perpetrator.406 Prosecutors also sometimes argue
that the reaction of others to the victim’s sexual assault will be worse
because of race.407 For example, one prosecutor argued, “I want you to
401. In doing so, prosecutors should not explicitly reference race or invoke the
stereotype of Black men as particularly violent, as the United States Supreme
Court has recently confirmed that such an approach is improper. Buck v.
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (reasoning that it was ineffective assistance
of counsel for defense counsel in a capital case to put on testimony of an
expert witness who relied on the defendant’s race as an aggravating factor
suggesting future dangerousness, and noting that “[i]t would be patently
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future
danger because of his race”). The Court noted that the witness’s “testimony
appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of black men as ‘violence
prone’” and called that argument “a particularly noxious strain of racial
prejudice.” Id. at 776.
402. See, e.g., Bennett, 842 F.3d at 325 (giving several examples of how the
improper arguments in that case could have been rephrased in race-neutral
ways that avoided appealing to stereotypes).
403. Johnson, supra note 137, at 1752–53.
404. See State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1214, 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
405. See supra notes 202, 207–211.
406. See, e.g., State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 610 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (involv–
ing repeated references to the victim as a “local woman” and then linking
her fear of the defendants to their race).
407. See, e.g., State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238, 1242 (Haw. 1999) (reversing
the defendant’s conviction based on the prosecutor’s argument that it is
“every mother’s nightmare . . . [to find] some black, military guy on top of
your daughter”); Lyon, supra note 15, at 328–29 (quoting State v. Richmond,
904 P.2d. 974, 983 (Kan. 1995)) (describing cases where prosecutors argued,
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think about how embarrassing it is for an 18-year-old white girl from
Crestview to admit she was raped by a black man. It is humiliating.”408
In these cases, the references to the perpetrator’s race are not made to
help identify the perpetrator or for any other legitimate purpose, but
instead to suggest that the victim’s shame or trauma would be worse
based on the race of the perpetrator and that those around her would
react accordingly. The court’s checklist should prohibit these arguments
linking race to the severity of the crime.
b.

Coded Language to Invoke Race or Stereotypes

Courts should also prohibit coded language that more subtly
invokes stereotypes. Again, the line between explicit appeals and more
subtle use of coded language may be difficult to draw, but my focus
here is on language that prosecutors might argue is not a reference to
race or stereotypes at all.409 This section does not try to cover every
type of coded appeal, but instead should help courts recognize coded
appeals generally.
One foundational category of coded appeals involves use of us/them
rhetoric. As explained above, ingroup/outgroup bias is a foundational
concept for understanding how race affects decision-making; people
tend to make more positive judgments about others within one’s
ingroup and make more negative judgments against those not part of
that group.410 Us/them arguments sometimes emphasize the ingroup
status of the victim, such as in the case in Hawaii where the prosecutor
repeatedly referred to the victim as a “local woman.”411 More com–
for example, to “[t]hink about having to divulge to your husband that you
were raped by a black male. Think about having to divulge that information
to law enforcement.”).
408. Lyon, supra note 15, at 330 (discussing State v. Reynolds, 580 So. 2d 254,
256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
409. Well-intentioned prosecutors may not recognize the racial dimensions of the
arguments discussed in this section, but courts should focus on impact
rather than intent; the rhetoric discussed in this section is likely to activate
juror stereotypes. This section should therefore also help educate wellintentioned prosecutors, who can therefore choose to avoid this racist
rhetoric.
410. See supra Part I(B)(1); see also Earle, supra note 34, at 1234 (footnotes
omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (“By creating
a ‘we’ and a ‘they,’ the prosecutor can induce jurors to decide the case based
upon stereotyped beliefs about other racial groups. Because ‘our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness,’
this kind of reference merits serious scrutiny.”).
411. See, e.g., Shabazz, 48 P.3d at 622 (referring to prosecutor’s statement
describing the victim as a “local woman” to appeal to the jurors’ ingroup
biases while referring to the defendants as “African-Americans”). In a few
cases, the prosecutors used ingroup/outgroup biases against defense counsel,
such as when the Black prosecutor argued that defense counsel’s argument
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monly, the prosecutor’s language stresses the defendant as a member of
an outgroup; for example, a prosecutor argued that the relevant
standard was “what would a reasonable person do under the
circumstances, not the culture that these people live in.”412 References
to “anti-snitching codes” can also be argued in a racially coded way.413
Similarly, one court noted a prosecutor’s statements that repeatedly
focused on the defendant’s immigration status to suggest he was lying
“went far beyond arguing that [the defendant] should not be trusted
because he uses a false identity. The government’s repeated references
to [his] status reinforced to the jury his foreign origin.”414
Relatedly, courts should beware of language that appeals to jurors
as a group in a way that positions the defendant on the other side of
the ingroup/outgroup line. For example, the prosecutor in one case
emphasized that the defendant was from the South Side of Chicago
while the victim of the case lived on the North Side of Chicago, where
the case was tried.415 The prosecutor stated that there was “no reason
for him to be there except to cause trouble, to look for some victim”
and concluded with the statement, “you decide whether to protect your
streets, your community from [the defendant].”416 This argument should
that the defendant had been misidentified was based on the idea that “we
all look alike” and contrasted “Mr. Boss’s [(defense counsel’s)] world” with
the witness’s “world.” United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735–36
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
412. State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (referring to the
prosecutor’s statement, “that’s the way these people talk”); see also United
States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996) (referring to the
prosecutor’s statements describing the defendants as “bad people” and then
arguing that there are many bad people in the world, and “[w]e are lucky
where we live not to come in contact with as many as there may be in other
parts of the country. But there are still some around here.”); Prasad, supra
note 49, at 3107–08 (giving examples of other cases with “these people”
language).
413. Compare State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (concluding
that the prosecutor inappropriately linked “this code to ‘black folk’ only”
when “[c]ommentators suggest the ‘no snitching’ movement is very broad”),
with United States v. Weekes, 224 F. App’x 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2007)
(alterations in original) (concluding that prosecutor reasonably inferred that
there was a “street code that says you don’t talk. You don’t become an
eyewitness” because the defendant had testified “nobody [is] going to talk
about that in [my neighborhood]”).
414. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
415. Lyon, supra note 15, at 328.
416. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Johnson, 581 N.E.2d 118, 126
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). The court rejected the defendant’s arguments that
these were appeals to racial prejudice, holding that it was “not improper for
the State to comment unfavorably upon the defendant or to urge the fearless
administration of the law.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 581 N.E.2d at 127). This
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have been treated as improper, because arguments “that identify the
defendant as a threat to the community . . . serve to motivate jurors
to punish the defendant (and to protect the community) by returning
a guilty verdict.”417
Prosecutors are also likely activating outgroup biases when they use
coded language that calls unnecessary attention to the defendant’s race.
For example, one author noted that “[p]rosecutors have called attention
to the Blackness of the defendant by making extraneous references to
African American hairstyles . . . [or] the fact that a defendant lives in
a segregated Black neighborhood.”418 The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that use of “po-leese” rather than “police” was a coded racial
appeal.419 The Seventh Circuit should have reached (but did not) the
same conclusion about the prosecutor’s references to “shucking and
jiving” about a Black witness and “Superfly” about a Black defen–
dant.420 Prosecutors also make inappropriate racially coded references
by referring to the “inner city” or calling the defendant a “thug” or
“hoodlum.” 421 These references, while not as explicitly racist as the
comments discussed in subsection (a) above, still have the power to
activate stereotypes and affect decision-making.
c.

Balancing the Probative Value Against the Prejudicial Effect of
Racial Language

Although courts should prohibit racist prosecutorial rhetoric to the
greatest possible extent, some references to race are inevitable; this
analysis, however, fails to recognize the power of ingroup/outgroup biases;
the court should have held that these comments were improper.
417. Alford, supra note 39, at 333. While we/they language may not always have
racist overtones, prosecutors should nevertheless avoid this rhetorical
approach in all cases, for the reasons explained in note 409 above. Prosecutors
should focus on the evidence of the individual defendant’s guilt, without
invoking group membership to motivate the jury.
418. Id. at 353 (first citing United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d
152, 160 (2d Cir. 1973); and then citing People v. Brown, 229 N.E.2d 922,
926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)).
419. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (“[T]he only reason to
use the word ‘poleese’ was to subtly, and likely deliberately, call to the
jury’s attention that the witness was African American and to emphasize
the prosecutor’s contention that ‘black folk don’t testify against black folk.’
. . . This conduct was highly improper.”).
420. Lyon, supra note 15, at 327 (discussing Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663
(7th Cir. 1995)).
421. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3098 (footnotes omitted) (noting that “inner-city,”
“welfare queens,” and “thugs” all allude to race without being explicit);
Cicchini, supra note 145 at 900 (footnotes omitted) (noting that “dope
pusher” and “‘hoodlum’ . . . could very well be considered inflammatory,
improper, and even reversible error”).
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subsection should help courts and prosecutors recognize the line
between proper and improper references to race. Fundamentally, courts
should prohibit references to race that appeal “to passion and prejudice”
while allowing references to race that refer to “facts and law.”422 In other
words, courts should be looking at whether a prosecutor’s reference to
race appeals to bias.423
In determining whether a prosecutor’s racial language appeals to
bias, courts should think about the probative value of the prosecutor’s
reference as compared to the likely prejudicial effect.424 This approach
is similar to the balancing courts do under Evidence Rule 403, although
courts should be careful not to overestimate relevance or discount the
potential prejudice from such evidence. 425 One author convincingly
argues that the probative value should have to substantially outweigh
the prejudicial effect, although that is the reverse of the typical
approach under Rule 403, which normally requires the prejudicial effect
to substantially outweigh the probative value in order to justify
exclusion.426
When focusing on relevance, courts should analyze the evidentiary
support for the reference to race. For example, if a case involves an
issue about the validity of cross-racial identification, there will need to
be more discussion of race than in a case that does not involve such an
issue.427 And a limited reference to race for purpose of identity would
often make sense. However, if identity is not disputed in a particular
case, then even a single reference to race would not be justified based

422. Earle, supra note 34, at 1222. As Earle correctly points out, however, “the
problem for courts lies not in recognizing this distinction, but in determining
into which category a racial reference falls.” Id.
423. See Armour, supra note 68, at 768 (“Group references that exploit,
exacerbate, or play on the prevailing stereotypes that factfinders carry with
them into the jury box subvert the rationality of the fact-finding process.
But references that challenge the factfinders to reexamine and resist their
discriminatory responses enhance the rationality of the fact-finding
process.”); Cialeo, supra note 286, at 447 (arguing that except in cases with
a racially-motivated crime, attorneys should not be able to ask leading
questions that “exhibit or are intended to appeal to or engender bias” in
cross-examining witnesses or when dealing with hostile witnesses on direct
exam). While Cialeo is focused on questioning witnesses, the same framework
is helpful when thinking more broadly about racist prosecutorial rhetoric.
424. See Earle, supra note 34, at 1234–36 (analogizing to Rule 403 analysis of
balancing probative value and prejudicial effect in trying to create a bright
line between neutral and non-neutral references to race).
425. See id. at 1230–31.
426. See id. at 1234–35 (discussing both Rule 403 and her proposed approach
without noting the reversal of the balancing test in her argument).
427. United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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on showing identity.428 Additionally, race will be relevant in cases where
there is evidence to suggest that the defendant’s motive for the crime
was racial.429 But in all these circumstances, courts should make sure
that the relevance of race is based on actual evidence, rather than
speculation.430
Additionally, courts should focus on the ways in which the
prosecutor handles these issues when analyzing prejudicial effect. As
noted above, repetition is a key rhetorical tool for affecting decisionmaking, 431 so courts should be particularly skeptical of unnecessary
repetition of racial references. For example, the court in State v.
Mitchell should have seen the sixteen references to Black males of
various sizes in opening argument as prejudicial, even if a single
reference would have been justified as being relevant to the identity
issue in the case.432 Similarly, even if a single reference to a defendant
being Black is relevant for identity purposes, that does not excuse the
highly prejudicial effect of repeatedly emphasizing that the victim or
the arresting officer in a case is white.433
When considering prejudice, courts should also focus on the specific
language used. As discussed above, coded language can invoke stereo–
types, so prosecutors should be using race-neutral rather than
428. See State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1240 (Haw. 1999) (noting that identity
was not an issue, so the lower courts’ reliance on identity to justify racial
reference was improper).
429. See, e.g., Cialeo, supra note 286, at 447 (talking about how crimes involving
racial motives will need to be treated differently); see also supra note 307
and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the defendant claims selfdefense based on racial fear; the prosecution in those cases needs to be able
to argue the ways in which race does not justify the defendant’s fear).
430. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit wrongly decided Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d
826 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit justified the prosecutor’s repeated
questions about racial motive for shooting police officers, and then stated
that the questions were harmless because the witnesses all denied the racial
motivation. Aliwoli, 225 F.3d at 831. The court failed to recognize that the
prosecutor never had any evidentiary basis on which to ask the questions.
See also Developments in the Law, supra note 393, at 1591–92. There, the
authors discuss an earlier case in which a federal district court held that the
prosecutor’s theory of the case violated due process. The prosecutor argued
that the two Black defendants killed the white victim because of racial
revenge for a murder of a white victim earlier the same day in the same
city, without any evidence linking the two cases—just resting on the
assumption of motive based on the race of the defendants and victims.
431. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
432. See State v. Mitchell, 783 A.2d 1249, 1258 (Conn. Ct. App. 2001); see also
Earle, supra note 34, at 1235 (arguing that “gratuitous” references to race,
“which by definition adds nothing to the trial, would be inadmissible under
Rule 402”).
433. Developments in the Law, supra note 393, at 1590.
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inflammatory language as much as possible. For example, a prosecutor
can focus on the evidence of brutality of the crime without analogizing
the defendant to an animal in doing so.434 Additionally, a prosecutor
can argue that people refused to come forward because of anti-snitching
norms without attributing that “code” to people of a particular race.435
Prosecutors should also focus on the individual defendant(s) without
making broader references to “these people.”436 And prosecutors should
be careful in sexual assault cases that their limited references to identity
does not suggest that the racial identity of the defendant or victim
somehow makes the crime worse. Courts should also remember that
denying something is about race is a rhetorical device that can invoke
prejudicial responses.437
2.

Require a Motion in Limine by Prosecutors for Proposed References
to Race on a Case-by-Case Basis

While courts could in some instances evaluate these line-drawing
issues during the flow of trial, the better practice is to require
prosecutors to bring a motion in limine in advance to justify their
planned use of race. Some commentators urge defense counsel to file a
motion in limine prohibiting references to race,438 but the better practice
would be to have prosecutors bring that motion seeking permission to
reference race either explicitly or implicitly.
Judge Furman of the Colorado Court of Appeals recently advocated
for this approach: “Parties should give notice of their intent to
introduce evidence or argument related to race and should have to
overcome a presumption that such evidence is irrelevant.” 439 This
approach would help both parties articulate their arguments, which can
help prosecutors focus on drawing appropriate lines and can make it
easier for defense counsel to respond. It would also help trial courts by
434. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The prosecutor easily
could have highlighted Bennett’s physical attributes in a race-neutral man–
ner. There was no impediment to the prosecutor’s ability to note ‘repeated
examples of [Bennett’s] proclivity to viciously and savagely attack others
defenseless to someone of his size.’ Indeed, the prosecutor did so in a raceneutral manner before the earlier mixed-race jury.”) (citations omitted).
435. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011).
436. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 2019)
(“[T]hat’s the way these people talk.”).
437. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 19, at 893.
439. People v. Robinson, 459 P.3d 605, 615 (Colo. App. 2017) (Furman, J.,
concurring), rev’d and remanded, 454 P.3d 229 (Colo. 2019). Unfortunately,
the Colorado Supreme Court declined to adopt this approach and overruled
the court of appeals’ decision to reverse the defendant’s conviction, holding
that any error was harmless. Robinson, 454 P.3d. at 236.

107

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

providing briefing on the issue and giving judges more time to decide
the issue than the court would have in ruling on an objection during
trial.440 Trial courts could then provide clearer directions about what
“is relevant and appropriate and help ensure that evidence or argument
related to race is only used for a proper and limited purpose.”441 This
approach would also provide a clearer record for appellate review.442
For example, a motion in limine would be particularly helpful in
cases where the prosecutor’s theory involves race as a motive. Courts
could require prosecutors to make an offer of proof about the
evidentiary support for that theory to ensure that prosecutors were not
simply relying on speculation. For example, in Aliwoli v. Carter, the
Seventh Circuit approved of the prosecutor’s questions about whether
the defendant’s beliefs as a Black Muslim gave him reason to shoot
police officers; the prosecutor argued that these questions were proper
to rebut the defendant’s insanity defense.443 If the court had required
the prosecution to provide an offer of proof demonstrating the eviden–
tiary basis for that theory, the court should have realized the prosecutor
was relying on speculation and prohibited the prosecution from asking
questions on this topic of several witnesses, all of whom denied that the
defendant’s race and “religion played any role in the crime . . . and
characterized black Muslims as peaceful and law-abiding citizens.”444
A motion in limine would also help clarify the appropriate
boundaries for arguments referring to places that could be seen as
invoking racial stereotypes. For example, in State v. Graves, the
prosecutor in Utah mentioned the defendant’s Puerto Rican heritage
fifty-seven times in a two-day trial, including forty-eight times during
the second day.445 The court concluded that some of these references
were justified because they referred to the defendant’s own alleged
statement at the time of the shooting that “[t]his is how we do it in
Puerto Rico,” which the prosecution contended showed that the
defendant fired the gun deliberately rather than accidentally. 446 A
pretrial motion could have helped resolve a dispute over the validity of
that argument as well as a factual question of whether the defendant

440. Jennifer M. Miller, To Argue Is Human, to Exclude, Divine: The Role of
Motions in Limine and the Importance of Preserving the Record on Appeal,
32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 541, 541 (2009).
441. Robinson, 459 P.3d at 615 (Furman, J., concurring).
442. Id.
443. Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2000).
444. Id.; see also supra notes 193, 429–430 and accompanying text (regarding
the evidentiary basis for motive arguments).
445. State v. Graves, 442 P.3d 1228, 1234 (Utah 2019).
446. Id. at 1232, 1234.
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had ever made that statement.447 A motion in limine could also have
helped clarify which references were more probative than prejudicial,
whether any of the specific contexts of the references were particularly
prejudicial, and whether the cumulative effect was likely to be
problematic such that the prosecutor should have found other ways to
discuss the issues.
A motion in limine can also be particularly helpful in addressing
the appropriate boundaries of prosecutor arguments that respond to
defense counsel’s theories. Many courts justify even fairly extreme
prosecutorial comments as appropriate responses to defense counsel’s
arguments.448 For example, State v. Cabrera involved issues about gang
membership of the defendants and various witnesses, and the
prosecutor and defense attorneys had different theories about the pro–
bative value and prejudicial effect of that evidence.449 The prosecutor
argued that some of its witnesses had been in gangs but were now trying
to get on with their lives, and the prosecutor accused defense counsel
of engaging in “wild, and I submit, racist speculation” about their
current gang involvement. 450 The prosecutor characterized defense
counsel’s argument as follows: “He’s a big, strong black man, but he’s
a rough character. Members of the Jury, this is not about race.”451 The
appellate court held that this language and the trial judge’s decision to
overrule the defense’s objection “may have led the jury to conclude that
defense counsel himself was racist—an implication wholly unsupported
by the record.” 452 A motion in limine could have helped both sides
determine the appropriate boundaries of how to talk about gang
membership and its potential connections to race, and it could also have
helped the trial court recognize the prosecution’s escalation of the
447. See id. at 1235 (noting that Graves denied having ever made the statement
and witnesses were inconsistent in their recollection of it). Even if the court
had allowed the prosecutor to ask about the statement, the court could
have cautioned the prosecutor about how to handle the conflicting evidence
about the statement rather than simply asserting that defendant had said
it. And a motion in limine combined with the checklist proposed in this
article might have either deterred the prosecutor from making references to
“these people” or put defense counsel and the trial court on notice about
the need to step in.
448. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–82 (1986) (justifying
prosecutor’s comment, that defendant was an animal who should not leave
his cell unless he was on a leash, on the grounds that it was “responsive to
the opening summation of the defense,” who argued that some other person
committed the crime and that perpetrator was an animal).
449. State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 472–74 (Minn. 2005).
450. Id. at 474.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 475.
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argument about the evidence into a rhetorical device invoking racial
stereotypes and blaming the other side for it. Similarly, a motion in
limine could help ensure that the prosecutor responds to the substance
of defense counsel’s argument rather than simply invoking a stereo–
type.453
C.

Responses When Problems Arise at Trial

If courts adopt the checklist and motion in limine requirements
discussed above, that should prevent many instances of racist
prosecutorial rhetoric, but some issues will still come up at trial.454 This
section is designed to help courts think through how to respond to those
issues.
1.

Act Sua Sponte When a Problem Occurs Rather Than
Requiring an Objection

Historically, trial courts have very rarely sua sponte reprimanded
prosecutors for racist rhetoric.455 But given the realities described above,
courts should be more willing to step in rather than waiting for defense
counsel to object. As discussed above, defense counsel may have a
variety of reasons for not objecting, including fear of the trial court
validating that rhetoric by overruling the objection and fear of being
seen as the one playing the race card.456 The North Carolina Supreme
Court acknowledged defense counsel’s challenges and concluded that it
is therefore “incumbent on the trial court to monitor vigilantly the

453. See United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(defense’s theory was that the defendant had been mis-identified, and the
prosecutor responded by arguing essentially that defense counsel thought
all Black people look alike). A motion in limine regarding the prosecution’s
proper response to the mis-identification theory should have helped both
the prosecutor and the court ensure that the prosecutor’s response focused
on the evidence showing that the identification was correct rather than
merely arguing that defense counsel was being racist. People v. Dizon, 697
N.E.2d 780, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (treating prosecutor’s references to
south Asian cultures and Latinos, which occurred during a discussion of
gangs, as invited by the defense’s misidentification theory). A motion in
limine could have helped the parties focus more clearly on the identifi–
cation issues and helped the prosecutor and the court avoid mixing up the
different Asian groups discussed.
454. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 459 P.3d 605, 615 (Colo. App. 2017) (Furman,
J., concurring), rev’d 454 P.3d 229 (Colo. 2019) (acknowledging that a
witness might unexpectedly introduce racial evidence at trial). Prosecutors
may also make racial references at trial, deliberately or inadvertently, not–
withstanding the procedures discussed above.
455. See Alford, supra note 39, at 337.
456. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text.
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course of such arguments [and] to intervene as warranted.”457 The court
further stated that “it becomes the duty of the trial judge to intervene
to stop improper argument and to instruct the jury not to consider it”
when, among other things, the prosecutor “become[s] abusive.”458
The checklist described above should help courts recognize when to
intervene, particularly when prosecutors use racial slurs or animal
imagery, or when prosecutors repeatedly reference the race of the
participants beyond what is strictly necessary. In such circumstances,
defense counsel may object, but trial courts should be willing to step in
even in the absence of an objection.
2.

Admonish the Prosecutor in Front of the Jury for Appealing to Bias
and Give a Specific Curative Instruction

Regardless of whether defense counsel objects or the trial court
intervenes sua sponte, trial courts should actively confront racist
language head-on rather than reinforcing colorblind narratives.
“Attempts at being colorblind can exacerbate the power of implicit
racial biases because ignoring race can cause automatic engagement of
stereotype-congruent responses.”459 Therefore, jurors are less likely to
be influenced by racist prosecutorial rhetoric when courts flag the racial
dimension, rather than simply sustaining an objection or using a more
generic label like “inflammatory.” 460 This labeling is particularly
important for “more subtle expressions of prejudice.” 461 Therefore,
courts should make clear to the jury that the language used might
trigger reactions based on bias or stereotype.462
457. State v. Jones, 558 S.E.2d 97, 105 (N.C. 2002). The court also talked about
entertaining and responding to objections. Id. But the issue in the case was
whether the trial court had erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu, i.e.
sua sponte, and the state supreme court agreed with defendant that the
trial court should have done so. See id. at 103.
458. Id. at 105.
459. Prasad, supra note 49, at 3100 (noting that people can suppress stereotyped
responses when made aware of those issues); see also Blasi, supra note 28,
at 1252 (“In order to inhibit judgments and behavior based on stereotypes,
we must be aware of the specific stereotype at the time it is activated.”).
460. See Earle, supra note 34, at 1215 (arguing that courts should “give serious
and consistent credence to charges of racism and recognize the many instances
in a trial in which subtle arguments may prey on unconscious fears and
resentments of the jury” rather than just deeming comments “regrettable” or
“improper”). While Earle’s focus was on appellate rather than trial courts,
the same logic applies to trial courts, particularly if they are going to take a
major role in dealing with racist prosecutorial rhetoric as argued in this article.
461. Blasi, supra note 28, at 1254.
462. Courts do not need to use the word “racist” in labeling the conduct; it is
probably more effective to talk about invoking a stereotype or triggering
bias. Consistent with the approach throughout the article, the focus should
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Furthermore, a reprimand in front of the jury may create more
personal risk for the prosecutor than the current approaches, which
externalize the costs of prosecutorial misconduct.463 If racist prosecu–
torial rhetoric contributes to the conviction, then the defendant bears
that cost, while the prosecutor’s office is the one that primarily bears
the cost of reversal on appeal.464 But when a trial court expressly labels
a prosecutor’s rhetoric as being an inappropriate invocation of bias or
stereotypes, the prosecutor will likely feel some shame.465 The trial court
should not set out to humiliate the prosecutor, but “psychologists have
long deemed shame a healthy tonic in appropriate doses because it
reminds the recipient of the societal norms that should guide and
circumscribe her thoughts and actions.” 466 Therefore, labelling the
prosecutorial rhetoric as an inappropriate invocation of bias or stereo–
type can help encourage prosecutors to avoid that behavior going
forward and help the jury guard against being influenced by that
rhetoric.467
After the court labels the improper remark as potentially triggering
bias, the trial court should give a specific rather than general curative
instruction. Reviewing courts sometimes rely on the fact that trial
courts gave general instructions not to rely on bias,468 but that approach
is flawed. If a trial court overrules an objection, or if the conduct is
be on the conduct rather than the person and to avoid moralizing language
when possible.
463. Green, supra note 268, at 812.
464. Id. at 812–13 (explaining why the prosecutor’s office bears the primary burden
of reversal but is still likely to back the individual prosecutor, concluding that
“even if the trial prosecutor’s behavior was clearly wrongful, the office may
excuse it on the theory that a suitably aggressive prosecutor cannot help but
get carried away occasionally”).
465. See Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by
Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 305, 312
(2016) (quoting Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach
to the Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.
105, 121 (1999)) (“Shame ‘falls along a continuum of emotions ranging from
embarrassment on one end to mortification on the other.’”).
466. Id.
467. See id. There may be some risk that this approach will lead jurors to
sympathize with the prosecutor, but the court in doing this labeling should
reinforce egalitarian norms of avoiding biased decision-making, rather than
specifically using the word “racist” or focusing on the prosecutor's intent.
468. For example, in Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), the case involving
the comment about the defendant being an animal who should not be let of
his cell except on a leash, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
conviction in part because “the trial court instructed the jurors several times
that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and
that the arguments of counsel were not evidence.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 182.
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never flagged as improper, then jurors could reasonably conclude that
the general instruction to avoid bias does not apply to the specific
comment at issue.469 The level of detail needed for curative instructions
will vary depending on the circumstances, but trial courts should
provide any specific direction needed to ensure that the jury properly
recognizes the situation and to encourage prosecutors to avoid similar
missteps in the future.470
3.

Grant a Mistrial for Particularly Serious or Repeated Violations
During the Same Trial

When an isolated remark is quickly corrected before the jury, that
should be a sufficient remedy. But in other circumstances, the court
should consider granting a mistrial. The foundational case on prosecu–
torial misconduct in argumentation emphasizes mistrial as a remedy.471
Mistrial is an appropriate remedy for many cases involving racist
prosecutorial rhetoric because of the difficulties in measuring potential
prejudice from that rhetoric.472 Mistrial is also appropriate in many of
these cases because of the significant harm caused by these remarks.473
When considering whether to grant a mistrial, courts should
provide both parties an opportunity to be heard outside the presence
of the jury.474 The prosecutor should have to argue why the comments
469. See, e.g., State v. Diehl, 528 S.E.2d 613, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d 545
S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 2001). The court of appeals correctly highlighted the
inadequacy of the trial court’s response to defense counsel’s objection, which
was “Well, let’s just—We’re not going to have that thing going on.” Id. at
615, 617. The appellate court correctly reasoned that this “overly brief and
vague comment did not admonish the jury to disregard the objectionable
remarks. We hold that direct and decisive action by the trial court was
required in the form of an instruction directed to the jurors notifying them
that the prosecutor’s appeal to race was improper and that they should
disregard it.” Id. at 617. Unfortunately, however, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed this decision and incorrectly concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. Diehl, 545 S.E.2d at 188.
470. See Prasad, supra note 49, at 3125 (noting that judges should “be prepared
to describe what implicit associations and stereotypes the improper argument
may draw”). Prasad relies on both the idea of providing clarification for the
jury and informal discipline/incentives for better behavior for the prosecutor.
See id.
471. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935) (“The trial judge, it is true,
sustained objections to some of the questions, insinuations and misstatements,
and instructed the jury to disregard them. But the situation was one which
called for stern rebuke and repressive measures and, perhaps, if these were
not successful, for the granting of a mistrial.”).
472. Lyon, supra note 15, at 334.
473. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 233 So. 3d 529, 563 (La. 2017).
474. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 333 (arguing that the court should hold an
immediate hearing without the jury present to determine whether a prosecu–
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were not likely to be prejudicial, and could also argue any probative
value to justify the remarks.475 Defense counsel should have the oppor–
tunity to respond to these arguments and could potentially provide
wider context for the remarks, such as how they relate to comments
made in voir dire.476 This hearing would help the trial court consider its
decision with a fuller picture of how the comments fit into the overall
trial, and would allow the court to make explicit findings that would
help the reviewing court on appeal if a mistrial is denied.477
The precise standard for granting a mistrial could vary according
to typical court practice, but courts should consider both the prejudicial
effect of the comments and any potential probative value they have.
For example, in Louisiana, a mistrial is mandatory after defense motion
when “during the trial or in argument, [the prosecutor] refers directly
or indirectly to . . . [r]ace, religion, color, or national origin, if the
remark or comment is not material and relevant and might create
prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the jury.”478 This app–
roach requires the court to find both a lack of probative value and a
potential for prejudice. Courts could instead use the stronger balancing
approach described above in the motion in limine section, requiring the
court to conclude that the probative value substantially outweighs any
potential for prejudice.479
Regardless of the precise standard used, a mistrial would generally
be appropriate for very serious racial references, such as slurs, animal
imagery, or other statements that directly invoke a negative stereotype.
Similarly, a mistrial would be appropriate if the prosecutor had brought
tor’s racist rhetoric was prejudicial). While defense counsel should generally
move for a mistrial, courts could ask to confer with the parties about this
remedy after intervening sua sponte, as discussed above. But defense counsel
should be allowed to weigh in on the appropriate remedy. Cf. Armour, supra
note 68, at 768 (suggesting that defense counsel should actually have the
ability to choose the remedy). While I think Armour’s suggestion goes too far,
I agree that defense counsel’s perspective should be an important consid–
eration.
475. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 333–34 (discussing a similar approach to a
hearing).
476. See, e.g., Thompson, 233 So. 3d at 529, 534 (discussing the connection
between the prosecutor’s comment in questioning a witness to an earlier
exploration of race in voir dire and both parties’ opening statements).
477. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 334 (noting the often inadequate record for
reviewing courts and the value of holding a hearing in providing a better
foundation for appellate review).
478. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 770. The “Official Revision Comment”
for the statute notes that “[t]his article purports to carry out, with some
variation, the jurisprudential rules with reference to remarks and comments
which normally are not cured and cannot be cured by an admonition.” Id.
479. See supra Section IV(B)(1)(c).
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a motion in limine and then made remarks that violated the court’s
decision on the motion. Mistrial would also be appropriate for cumu–
lative violations, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States. 480 Ultimately, trial courts should be more willing to grant a
mistrial in order to guard against racist prosecutorial rhetoric preju–
dicing the defendant and to ensure that prosecutors bear the burden of
avoiding this rhetoric.481
D.

Track Repeat Violators Across Trials

Finally, I recommend that courts provide greater transparency and
tracking of these rebukes across cases. 482 That approach can take a
variety of different forms, such as a searchable database that records
key information about incidents of racist prosecutorial misconduct or a
compilation of transcripts of these instances.483 Regardless of the exact
mechanism used to implement this idea, these “rebuke banks” could be
helpful in several ways.484
On an individual level, these rebuke banks may help incentivize
prosecutors to ensure that their rhetoric does not cross the line. This
applies both to new prosecutors wanting to avoid rebukes and longtime prosecutors who may need to shift their behavior after recognizing
the ways that their previous rhetoric may have been problematic.485
After all, the key goal of this article and these strategies is to prevent
racist prosecutorial rhetoric.
Additionally, this approach would help courts and disciplinary
authorities identify repeat offenders. For trial courts, that information
could be helpful as they play an increased role in being vigilant about
480. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935); see supra note 471 and
accompanying text.
481. Lyon, supra note 15, at 334–35.
482. This specific proposal relies heavily on Bruce Green’s recommendation. See
Green, supra note 268, at 815–18. But it is also conceptually similar to creating
a “prosecutorial misconduct project” tracking appellate court reversals for
prosecutorial misconduct. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1059, 1064 (2009). Both Green and Gershowitz argue that making this
kind of information available would help identify repeat offenders and put
pressure on prosecutors’ offices to improve their cultures and practices. See id.
at 1065; Green, supra note 268, at 815–16.
483. See Green, supra note 268, at 815 (arguing for a searchable database of trial
transcripts). The exact mechanism may vary across courts based on logistics,
and chief judges or court administrators should explore the most workable
version of this approach for their particular jurisdiction.
484. See id. at 815–18.
485. See id. at 816; see also id. at 813 (discussing the potential for “unethical
amnesia” when individual rebukes do not also include more structural remedies
as well).
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listening for racist prosecutorial rhetoric and acting sua sponte.
Knowing who has been rebuked before and why may help judges
recognize more subtle racial appeals in future cases. It may also be
helpful in encouraging judges to refer these repeat offenders for
disciplinary action and for disciplinary authorities to have more
complete information upon which to act.486
Finally, and crucially, rebuke banks would help decision-makers
identify patterns within prosecutor offices, which in turn can lead to
more structural reforms. 487 This increased transparency can support
efforts by supervisors to strengthen a “culture of compliance” within
offices that could improve “internal culture and controls.” 488
Additionally, this device could help encourage office-wide trainings as
needed, and could even help with efforts to hold senior administrators
accountable for office-wide problems.489 These more structural incen–
tives should help counterbalance the structural pressures on prosecutor
offices to focus more on convictions than on their important role in
ensuring justice.490 Ultimately, these changes are crucial for dealing with
the structural problems of racial bias within the criminal justice system.

Conclusion
Racist prosecutorial rhetoric is a serious problem that poses a threat
to the integrity of the criminal justice system. This article has attemp–
486. Green correctly notes that disciplinary authorities have generally been
unwilling to discipline prosecutors in these cases. Id. at 811; see also Prasad,
supra note 49, at 3119–22 (discussing prosecutor discipline and arguing that
courts have so far overestimated that technique for handling racist prosecu–
torial rhetoric). It may be that disciplinary rule changes are also needed,
something I plan to explore in a future article.
487. See Green, supra note 268, at 816–17.
488. Id. at 816.
489. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0,
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 51, 70 (2016) (“[C]ritics increasingly push blame
up the ladder in the prosecutors’ office, perceiving low-level prosecutorial
wrongdoing as symptomatic of bad culture, bad leadership, bad compli–
ance systems, or other systemic inadequacies for which supervisors and
chief prosecutors should be held responsible.”).
490. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 16, at 330 (discussing the structural pressures
on prosecutors and their offices); Godsey, supra note 83, at 34 (describing
“administrative evil,” the way that actors in a bureaucracy are structurally
conditioned to focus on what’s good for the organization in a way that can
functionally silence individuals’ own moral compasses); Richardson, supra
note 22, at 871 (describing an ethnographic study of criminal courts in Cook
County, Illinois, in which several prosecutors expressed personal misgivings
about the criminal justice system but “learned to rationalize their racialized
behaviors by separating their perspectives from their practices” and treating
their practice of law as a duty that did not need to reflect their personal
beliefs).
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ted to educate judges and prosecutors on how to rethink rhetorical
choices within criminal cases. Doing so is an important part of the
overall reckoning about the role of racism within the criminal justice
system and is necessary for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted
fairly and impartially.
Trial courts should take the lead in recognizing racist prosecutorial
rhetoric and in taking steps to prevent prosecutors from using that
rhetoric. Trial judges are also in the best position to act when
prosecutors do use this rhetoric and to evaluate appropriate remedial
measures. The line-drawing questions presented by prosecutorial rhet–
oric can be challenging, but this article has proposed an approach that
can help courts draw these lines more clearly, allowing for prosecutors
to argue the appropriateness of race-related language and arguments in
individual cases while prohibiting a much wider swath of both coded
and explicitly racist language than courts typically label as inapprop–
riate. This article also includes a method for tracking racist
prosecutorial misconduct across cases that would facilitate better
systemic information about the scope of the problem, which will help
provide more systemic responses.
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Appendix A: Possible Checklist for Courts to Use in
Prohibiting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric:
Prosecutors should keep their arguments focused on the specific
evidence regarding the defendant in a particular case, rather than using
broader language that invokes stereotypes or group-based biases.
Courts should enforce this approach and should prohibit the following
types of arguments or language as being inherently biased, regardless
of the prosecutor’s intent:
•
•

•
•
•
•

Racial slurs
Animal references/analogies (including actual animals, use of
other words that convey animal imagery like “hunt” or
“habitat,” movie references like “Gorillas in the Mist,”
references to monsters or other non-human imagery, etc.)
Language invoking stereotypes (e.g. Dixie/cotton reference,
generalizations about groups based on race/ethnicity, coded
language to invoke race)
Us/them references (e.g. “these people,” “protect your
community”)—do not try to divide the jury from the defendant
based on generalized appeals
Unnecessary emphasis on locations with racial connotations or
the race of the defendant or the victim beyond what is necessary
in the case
Arguments suggesting that the severity of the crime or trauma
from it is worse because of the race of the people involved
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Despite these general prohibitions, some cases require a discussion
of race. In such cases, courts should require a motion in limine by the
prosecution to justify the probative value of racial references and to
ensure that it substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. Courts and
prosecutors should consider the following general guidelines in connec–
tion with this motion:
Likely Appropriate (substantially
more probative than prejudicial)
• Limited reference to race for
identification purposes only
when identity is an issue

Likely Inappropriate (more preju–
dicial than probative)
• Repeated references to race to
show identity, or a single refer–
ence to race to show identity
when identity is not disputed

•

Discussion of race in connec–
tion with the validity of crossracial identification

•

Accusations that identification
argument is based on stereo–
type that all people of a race or
ethnicity look alike

•

Arguments related to racial
motive only when there is evi–
dence supporting that theory

•

Arguments related to race as
motive that are based on
speculation or generalizations
rather than concrete evidence

Note that a motion in limine should never be used to justify racial
slurs or animal imagery, which are never probative and are always
highly prejudicial.
Similarly, a motion in limine should not justify invocation of a
stereotype; the prosecutor should focus instead on the evidence in the
case without making broader group references to invoke stereotypes.
Additionally, courts should not over-rely on the idea of the
prosecutor’s remarks being an invited response to defense counsel’s
argument. The prosecutor’s response should focus on the substance of
the argument (e.g. mis-identification, self-defense) without either
explicitly or implicitly invoking stereotypes or bias.
Finally, references to race, even when relevant, should be kept to a
minimum to the extent possible under the circumstances of the
individual case. Repeated references are more likely to be prejudicial,
and the probative value can generally be established through limited
references.
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